Conflict and Cooperation: an experimental analysis of intergroup and intragroup aggression by Umashev, Nicholas
 Faculty of Business, Economics, and Law 
School of Economics 
 
Conflict and Cooperation: an experimental analysis of 
intergroup and intragroup aggression 
By Nicholas Umashev1 (BEcon, BCom) 
Supervisors: Professor Daniel Zizzo, Dr. Alexandros Karakostas 
 
25th of October 2019 
 
An  Honours Thesis submitted to the School of Economics, The University of Queensland, in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BEcon(Honours) 
 
Word Length: 17,379 
  
                                                 
 
1 Contact: School of Economics, University of Queensland, Level 6 Colin Clark Building, 
Blair Dr, QLD, 4072, Australia. Tel: +61 438886536. Email: 
nicholas.umashev@uqconnect.edu.au 
  
Page 1 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the significant contributions made by my thesis supervisors, 
Professor Daniel Zizzo and Dr Alexandros Karakostas. Both Prof. Zizzo and Dr. Karakostas 
have exceeded all expectations in devoting their time and financial resources toward my 
academic pursuits.  
 
Just as group identity must be continuously primed to be maintained,  I extend my appreciation 
to Dr Trevor Gallen, Dr Saif Mehkari, and Dr Orphe Pierre Divounguy for priming my interest 
in economics throughout pivotal points in my studies. I would also like to thank Dr Joseph 
Clark, Dr John Humphreys, and my secondary school Deputy Headmaster Steve Uscinski for 
inspiring my academic pursuits.  
 
Special mention should be made of Professor Yan Chen and Dr Kan Takeuchi, who, to my 
surprise, responded to the email queries they received from a lowly Honours student on the 
other side of the world. 
 
The enumeration in this thesis, of certain thanks, should not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained or withheld.   
  
Page 2 
Declaration Statement 
 
I declare that the work presented in this Honours thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, original and my own work, except as acknowledged in the text, and that material has not 
been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other university. 
  
  
Nicholas Umashev, 24th of October 2019 
 
  
  
Page 3 
Abstract 
The field of behavioral economics has recently focused on investigating the effects of group 
identity on decision-making. The aim of this thesis is to examine whether group identity 
exacerbates conflict between groups and reduces it within a group under an experimental 
setting. This involved the use of two experiment designs and 160 random participants. Both 
experiment designs consisted of two parts: (1) group identity inducement, and (2) the vendetta 
game. For Part 1 participants were assigned to a group based on their preferences over a set of 
paintings by Klee and Kandinsky and then underwent one of two group priming methods. In 
Experiment 1, participants had their senese of group identity primed via online communication. 
In Experiment 2, participants were primed via ‘common fate’, wherein participants of the same 
group identity shared the outcome of a lottery. Part 2 involved participants being matched with 
either a heterogeneous, homogeneous, or unknown counter-participant and answering whether 
they would Take or Don’t Take in a stylized mini-vendetta game (Bolle, et al., 2014). Overall, 
for both Experiment 1 and 2, we find no statistically significant behavioural differences between 
participants matched with a co-participant of the same group identity and those matched with a 
co-participants of a difference group identity. While we find no support for prosocial 
preferences within groups nor antisocial preferences between groups, the high instances of 
participants taking in the vendetta game suggest that social preferences are a motivating factor 
for aggressive behaviour. 
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1 Introduction 
Groups play a fundamental role in society and the formation of our identity. Whether you are a 
member of a family, a workplace, an ethnicity, or even identify with a particular philosophy, 
the influence of groups on human behaviour is profound. With their potential to solve or 
exacerbate collective action problems (Olson, 1965), impede or foster civic organization 
(Banfield, 1958), and lead to conflict or cooperation (Dovido, et al., 2009), the impact of groups 
is not always cut and dry.  
 
There is a plethora of evidence from non-experimental studies that show the importance of 
group identity. While these methods have traditionally focused on analyzing the effect of groups 
through the use of aggregate macroeconomic data, such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
measures (Alesina, et al., 2003), they have faced criticism due to confounds to measurement 
error (Driessen, 2008). In response to these issues, there has been a surge of experimental 
studies aiming to address how groups shape behaviour (Lane, 2016). To do this, 
experimentalists have sought methods of artificially inducing groups in laboratory settings to 
eliminate the potential confounds present in happenstance field data. In doing so, 
experimentalists aim to establish the role of group identity in shaping human interaction and 
socio-economic phenomenon at large. 
 
By artificially inducing groups, experimental economists have established the importance of 
group identity in shaping the outcome of bargaining games (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 
2002), public goods games (Tan & Bolle, 2007), the prisoner’s dilemma (Charness, et al., 
2007), and more. However, experimental studies on whether group identity exacerbates conflict 
between groups and reduces it within a group have yielded mixed results, with Chen and Chen 
(2011) finding beneficial effects arising from Ingroup interaction and Coq et al. (2015) finding 
positive effects from Outgroup interaction. Due to aggressive behaviour occurring, even in 
instances with no economic rationale (Abbink & Herrmann, 2009), social factors, such as group 
identity, potentially explain why costly conflict occurs. Understanding the relationship between 
group identity and conflict is necessary to develop mechanisms that increase cooperation, social 
ties, and a plethora of other socio-economic outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, we present 
the one of the first experimental studies analyzing the relationship between group identity and 
aggressive behaviour. 
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In this paper, the role of group identity in exacerbating or reducing conflict is investigated 
experimentally through the use of two experiments. The experiments involve different group 
inducement methods followed by participants playing the mini-vendetta game (see Bolle et al. 
2014) against either a homogeneous, heterogeneous, or unknown co-participant. The mini-
vendetta game is utilized to analyze group effects in the context of aggressive behaviour.  
 
We examine whether ingroup bias is caused by prosocial preferences amongst members of the 
same group or antisocial preferences between members of different groups. This paper further 
explores the effect of participants’ beliefs and self-reported levels of group association.   
 
We find that participants matched with a homogeneous co-participant do not exhibit ingroup 
bias – in that they neither exacerbate nor reduce conflict consistently. Likewise, matching 
participants with a heterogeneous co-participant does not lead to a different outcome, when 
compared to a homogeneous or unknown match, in the mini-vendetta game. Our findings 
suggest that ingroup bias is not a significant determinant of behaviour and thus is neither caused 
by prosocial nor antisocial preferences.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following manner: in section 2 we provide an 
overview of relevant literature, section 3 presents our hypotheses, section 4 provides describes 
the Experiment 1’s design, section 5 reports our results from Experiment 1, section 6 describes 
Experiment 2’s design, and section 7 reports our results from Experiment 2.   
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2 Literature Review 
In this section we introduce recent literature on experimental methods for group inducement 
and the behavioural effects of groups.  In addition to this, the literature on vendetta games, 
which aim to explore aggressive behaviour, is presented. 
 
2.1 Group Induction Literature 
The study of group identity in experiments was first popularized by Tafjel et al. (1971) wherein 
the authors identified the minimal conditions for establishing in-group favoritism and out-group 
derogation based on the group identity of experiment participants. Tafjel et al. (1971) found 
that assigning groups based on the mere (and arbitrary) categorization of participants is 
sufficient for the exaggeration of both the differences between groups and the similarities within 
a group. 
 
As a framework for group inducement in experimental settings, Tafjel, et al. (1971) developed 
the minimal group paradigm (MPG). To limit external influences and conflating factors, Tafjel. 
et al (1971) posits that:  
 
1. Participants should be randomly assigned to groups. 
2. Groups should remain anonymous. 
3. Group members should have no interaction with one another. 
4. Intergroup allocations or evaluations should not be tied to payment.  
 
The four MPG conditions are the basis for assessing the validity of group identity experiments 
(Sabine, 2016). To induce group identities that are consistent with the minimal group paradigm, 
the five primary methods of group inducement include the use of: (1) name memorization, (2) 
t-shirt teaming, (3) shape identification, (4) real random groups, and (5) painting preferences. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these five methods are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Group Inducement Methods 
 
 
The name memorization method (Pinter & Greenwald, 2011) for group inducement involves 
the participant being shown the names of their corresponding group members and being tasked 
with memorizing them over 45 seconds. To reinforce their sense of group membership, the 
participant is then shown a name (including their own) and tasked with determining whether 
that name is one associated with their group or not. One of main issues with the name 
memorization method is that it breaches anonymity in addition to the difficulty in collecting 
and presenting participants’ names. Furthermore, names can cause participants to identify (or 
misidentify) characteristics that may be associated with a particular group and therefore 
influence the participants' behaviour.  
 
The t-shirt teaming method (Morita & Servatka, 2013) involves participants being randomly 
divided into two groups before being provided a colored t-shirt indicating their group identity. 
Participants are seated in an area designated for their group and are then instructed to stand up 
and verify that all their group members are wearing the same colour t-shirts. A potential issue 
for the t-shirt teaming method is that it violates criteria 2 and 3 of the minimal group paradigm 
in that group membership is not anonymous and group members interact with each other. 
 
The shape identification method (Hertel & Kerr, 2001) involves testing participants for 
cognitive representation styles under the pretense that they would be assigned as either ‘shape 
dependent’ or ‘shape independent’. The test for cognitive representation style involves 
participants sorting five sets of symbols according to the perceptual feature they feel is most 
prominent. Following the test, all participants are classified as shape dependent regardless of 
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their test results. The assignment of all participants as shape dependent raises possible ethical 
concerns due to the test potentially being deceitful. Though this method could be modified via 
participants being correctly assigned to either the shape dependent or shape independent group, 
this could give rise to potential confounds between group assignment and individual 
characteristics.  
 
Real random groups were used by Goette et al. (2006) to study the effect of group membership 
on cooperation and norm enforcement. This involved the use of platoons in the Swiss Army, 
which due military conscription are composed of randomly assigned individuals. The use of 
real random groups eliminates the confounding effect of self-selection into groups while 
maintaining an environment that fosters a sense of group identity. However, the availability of 
real random groups is severely limited and prone to major experimenter demand effects.  
 
The painting preferences method, developed by Tajfel et al. (1971), is widely used in 
experimental economics. This method involves participants reviewing five anonymized pairs 
of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky and based on their selection of these five pairs of paintings 
being allocated to one of two groups. Due to the apparent arbitrariness of the painting 
preferences method, some experimentalists have argued in favor of random colour assignment 
as an alternative. This is on the presumption that groups based on painting preferences may 
have unique within-group attributes (Chen & Yan, 2011). Furthermore, Chen and Li (2009) 
find no significant behavioural difference between participants induced via random colour 
assignment and those induced via painting preference assignment. However, due to random 
colour assignment lacking a formal process for group inducement, assigning groups based on a 
preference selection process could potentially enhance levels of group association. This view 
is supported by Heap and Zizzo (2009), who find that the psychological value that individuals 
place on being in a group is not statistically significant when the random colour assignment 
method is used. Supporting the use of a formalized process for group inducement, Guala & 
Filippin (2017) also demonstrate that, in the case of decisions involving spite and costly giving2, 
random colour assignment of groups does not yield significant group membership effects.  
                                                 
 
2 Chen and Li (2009) use an Outgroup Treatment as the baseline for measuring the effect of ingroup bias, which, 
compared to using participants who are not assigned groups as the baseline, magnifies the effect of group 
identity. In contrast to this, Guala & Filippin (2017) measure the net effect of Ingroup identity by using a 
treatment involving no group as their baseline. Contributing to the different results from the two studies, Guala 
& Filippin (2017) exclude games involving the confounding effect of reciprocity from their study 
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Participant’s sense of group identity can be strengthened by combining the group inducement 
processes with an array of different group priming methods. As part of their group inducement 
process, both Chen and Li (2009) and Morita & Servatka (2013) utilize online communication 
to strengthen group identity.  
 
Hertel and Ker (2001) prime participants via a verbal memory task based on the methodology 
explored by Fiedler and Hertel (Fiedler & Hertel, 1994). The verbal memory task involves 
participants attempting to memorize thirty words scattered unsystematically with a subset of 
ten of these words relating to the concept of loyalty. The use of common fate to prime group 
identity is explored in Corazzini & Sugden (2009), wherein participants played a repeated linear 
public good game, and the outcome of a collective lottery determined whether they received 
payment for the public good game. The authors found that common fate increased contributions 
and reciprocity in the repeated public good game. Likewise, Zhang (2019) and find that 
common fate increases cooperation in public good games while (Zizzo, 2003) finds that 
common fate increases between group conflict but in though has minimal effect on within-
group conflict.  
 
2.2 Behavioural Effects of Group Identity Literature  
There is a considerable amount of literature surrounding the behavioural effects of group 
identity. While the literature generally suggests that participants of the same group identity 
exhibit more prosocial behaviour and results in more cooperative outcomes, there are several 
instances where this is not the case. 
 
Abbink and Harris (2019) document the occurrence of rivalry against individuals belonging to 
naturally occurring groups outside of one’s own. Furthermore, Yamagishi & Kiyonari (2000) 
find that, in a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game, participants matched with an Ingroup co-
participant are more likely to cooperate than those matched with an Outgroup co-participant. 
However, the authors also find that the relationship between group identity and cooperation 
does not hold in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with full-information. This suggests that 
ingroup bias is the result of participants’ expectation of generalized reciprocity as opposed to 
direct reciprocity. Thus, it is expected individuals undertaking simultaneous games or quasi-
simultaneous games (i.e. those without direct responses such as when the strategy method is 
utilized) would exhibit a stronger ingroup bias than individuals undertaking sequential games.  
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Furthermore, the results from an experiment conducted by Guala & Filippin (2017) indicate 
that increasing the complexity of a game reduces ingroup bias in participants. Specifically, 
Guala & Filippin (2017) conclude that merely a pair of dominated allocations, in a single 
information set, is sufficient to nullify the effect of group membership. Note that, while the 
mini-vendetta game contains two dominated allocations3, the two dominated allocations are not 
contained in the same information set.  
 
Contrary to the view that Ingroup matches perform at least as well as Outgroup matches, Coq 
et al. (2015) compare the effects of Ingroup and Outgroup matches in the centipede game - 
finding that Outgroup matches performed significantly better than Ingroup matches. Coq et al. 
(2015) suggest that this counter-intuitive result is due to participants acting as though the 
behaviour of an Outgroup co-participant is random relative to being matched with an Ingroup 
co-participant4. Thus, participants hold the view that members of the Outgroup are strategically 
unsophisticated and feel as if they are less able to predict the behaviour Outgroup co-
participants5. 
 
2.3 Vendetta Games Literature 
Vendetta games involve tasks where participants interact in a way such that either a retaliatory, 
non-retaliatory, or cooperative outcome occurs. Vendetta games are designed to measure 
aggression between participants, under the pretense that, for the First Mover, aggression is 
economically costly.  
 
In an experiment designed to study the occurrence of pointless aggression, Abbink & Hermann 
(2009) utilize a vendetta game involving two groups of four players who sequentially decide 
whether or not to reduce the payoff of their opposing group, despite this aggression costly for 
                                                 
 
3 The dominated allocations in the mini-vendetta game are (Take; Don’t Take) and (Don’t Take, Don’t Take; Take) 
4 In the centipede game, the best response to a co-participant making uniformly random decisions is to choose to 
continue. Note that, in the centipede game, the unique subgame-perfect nash equilibrium is for players to choose 
‘stop’ at each of their decision nodes – ending the opportunity for exponentially higher payoffs if choosing 
‘continue’. 
5 In the mini-vendetta game, the Bayesian Nash Equilibria for a First Mover matched with a co-participant making 
uniformly random decisions is to Take. In the case of a Second Mover, matched with a co-participant making 
uniformly random instead of strategic decisions, Don’t Take ceases to be the only best response to the First Mover 
choosing to Take5. Therefore, we would expect that participants matched with an Outgroup co-participant would 
be more likely to Take due to viewing the Outgroup co-participant as strategically unsophisticated.  
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their own group. Despite there being no gain from aggression reducing the opposing groups' 
payoffs, Abbink & Hermann (2009) find that 20% of participants in the initial round choose to 
act aggressively and that from round five onwards the rate of aggression stabilized to 10%.6  
 
Likewise, in a finitely repeated vendetta game involving two players who consecutively choose 
to steal or not steal 10% blocks of  ‘the winning probability of a prize’ from their co-participant, 
Bolle et al. (2014) find excessive levels of stealing. In this case, the vendetta game is constructed 
such that it ends after four consecutive rounds of not stealing occurs or if the terminal state is 
reached7. Bolle et al. (2014)  find that the terminal state is reached two-thirds of the time, 
wherein the probability of participant’s winning the prize was reduced to the minimum possible 
level.  
 
Both Abbink & Hermann (2009) and Bolle et al. (2014) introduce treatments that indicate the 
significant role of social factors in increasing and reducing aggressive behaviour. In the case of 
Abbink & Hermann (2009), the introduction of a lottery payment awarded to a member of each 
group increased the frequency of aggressive acts from 20% to 54% in the first round of the 
vendetta game. In the case of Bolle et al. (2014), the introduction of emotion elicitation between 
rounds in the vendetta game considerably reduced stealing rates.  Likewise, implementing 
breaks between rounds reduced instances of aggression. From this, it is clear that social factors 
play a significant role in determining whether individuals cooperate or behave aggressively. 
This highlights the importance of examining vendetta games within the context of group 
identity. 
 
2.4 Literature Review Summary 
Overall, while the literature on group inducement and the behavioural effects of groups is 
extensive, there is a significant gap in the literature on the effect of groups on aggressive 
behaviour. We aim to fill this gap by studying the effect of group identity using the mini-
vendetta game. The literature on group inducement and behaviour informed the design of our 
group inducement methods, while the literature on vendetta games set the basis for how 
aggression can be measured. By combining the two, we aim to shed light on aggressive 
behaviour in the context of group identity.   
                                                 
 
6 The vendetta game in Abbink & Hermann (2009) was played over 10 identical rounds 
7 The terminal state occurs when both players are unable to steal due to neither of them having a greater than 10% 
winning probability 
  
Page 14 
3 Hypotheses 
Based on previous research, we expect participants to have stronger altruistic preferences 
towards members of their Ingroup relative to members of the Outgroup. This forms the basis 
for Hypothesis 1, that participants exhibit ingroup bias when comparing Ingroup and Outgroup 
behaviour. For Hypothesis 1 to be valid, participants must hold either prosocial preferences 
towards homogeneous co-participants (Hypothesis 2) or antisocial preferences towards 
heterogeneous co-participants (Hypothesis 3). In this sense, hypotheses 2 and 3 disentangle the 
expected observations under hypothesis 1 in separating to what extent ingroup bias is caused 
by positive discrimination or negative discrimination.  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Ingroup Bias (H1): participants matched with a co-participant in the same 
group will be less aggressive than participants matched with a co-participant in the opposite 
group  
 
Hypothesis 2 - Positive Discrimination (H2): for participants matched with a co-participant in 
the same group, positive discrimination occurs where participants will be more cooperative 
compared to the control group  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Negative Discrimination (H3): for participants matched with a co-participant in 
the opposite group, negative discrimination occurs where participants will be more aggressive 
compared to the control group  
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4 Experiment 1 Design 
Experiment 1 involved participants sense of group association being primed via Ingroup 
communication. Experiment 1 contains a group induction process, an understanding check, 
three rounds of the mini-vendetta games, and a questionnaire.  
 
4.1 Vendetta Game 
A stylized ‘mini-vendetta’ game, similar to that developed by Bolle et al (2014), is used to 
measure the impact of group identity on behaviour. The mini-vendetta game is a sequential one-
shot game involving a First Mover (M1) and a Second Mover (M2), with the following 
sequence of choices: 
 
1. The First Mover is given the option to Take or not Take from their co-participant - (First 
Mover, Round 1) 
2. If the First Mover chose to Take, the Second Mover is given the option to Take or not 
Take from their co-participant and the game ends - (Second Mover, Post-Take) 
3. If the First Mover chose to not Take, the Second Mover is given the option to Take or 
not Take from their co-participant. If the Second Mover chooses to not Take the game 
ends - (Post-Don’t Take) 
4. If the Second Mover Takes in response to the First Mover not taking, the First Mover is 
given the option to Take or not Take from their co-participant and the game ends - (First 
Mover, Round 2) 
 
The mini-vendetta game is surmised in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Mini-Vendetta Decision Tree 
 
Notes: Payoffs are expressed in tokens, with their exchange rate to Australian dollars given at the 
beginning of the experiment.  
 
4.2 Experiment 1 – Communication Priming 
For Experiment 1, the group inducement method we used is based on Chen and Li (2009) and 
is outlined below: 
 
1. Participants are presented with a series of 5 pairs of anonymized paintings by Klee and 
Kandinsky (see appendix A4) and for each given pair select which painting they prefer  
2. Participants are assigned into either the Klee or Kandinsky group based on their relative 
painting preferences8 
3. Participants are shown two additional paintings and are given ten minutes to answer 
which painting is by Klee and which is by Kandinsky (see appendix A). During this 
stage, the participants have access to a communication program where they can chat 
with members of their group to solve the group task 
                                                 
 
8 Note that we assign a value of 1 for the participant selecting a Kandinsky and a value of 2 for the participant 
selecting a Klee painting. Participants are allocated to the Kandinsky group if the sum of their preferences are 
below the median sum of the participant pools’ preferences or to the Klee group if otherwise. We use relative 
preferences to ensure an equal number of Kandinsky and Klee participants in the subject pool. 
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Due to heterogeneity in the group inducement process, which results from the interaction 
between participants in the chat phase, to maximize the number of independent observations 
each group consisted of 2 participants. To reduce the heterogeneity of the communication 
priming mechanism, participants are referred to solely as either “Klee Member” or “Kandinsky 
Member” in the chat dialog to maintain anonymity.  
 
After group inducement has taken place, participants play a sequence of three one-shot mini-
vendetta games, with each one-shot game being of a different match type. For the match type, 
we employ three treatments: the Neutral Treatment (N)9, Ingroup Treatment (I), and Outgroup 
Treatment (O). The qualities of the three treatments is outlined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Treatments, Experiment 1 
Treatment Match Features 
Neutral Treatment (N) The participant is matched with an unknown counter-participant 
Ingroup Treatment (I) The participant is matched with a homogeneous counter-participant 
Outgroup Treatment (O) The participant is matched with a heterogeneous counter-participant 
 
Since the order of match types in the game must be arbitrarily selected, the order of play with 
respect to the three treatments is randomly interchanged to control for order effects (Friedman, 
et al., 1994) 
 
4.3 Experiment Procedures 
The experiment took place in the Behavioural and Economic Science Cluster Laboratory 
(BESC) at the University of Queensland (UQ) with a total of 162 participants from 
undergraduate and postgraduate backgrounds. The participants were randomly selected using 
the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2004). The experiment program was designed using 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the experimental data was converted into Stata format using 
ztree2stata (Takeuchi, 2010). 
                                                 
 
9 The Neutral match type allows for the experiment’s results to be compared with a baseline case where group 
interaction does not influence the game, wherein participants undergo a Neutral round of the game and the 
counter-participants identity is concealed. Since both participants are still induced in a group, the baseline case 
will account for the impact of the group inducement method on the mini-vendetta game while excluding group 
matching effects. This allows us to separate both positive discrimination and negative discrimination from 
ingroup bias. 
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Prior to the vendetta game being played, participants underwent an understanding check (see 
appendix). Post the vendetta game being played, participants underwent a questionnaire related 
to demographics, beliefs, and the SDS17 (for a discussion of the SDS17 see Stober 2001). In 
this instance, the SDS17 is used as a measure of participants’ sensitivity to social pressure and 
experimenter demand effects (see Fleming & Zizzo 2013). 
 
We utilize the strategy method instead of the direct response method in order to get a complete 
strategy set from every participant. This involves the participant making conditional decisions 
against a hypothetical counter-participant for each possible point in the game (for a discussion 
of the strategy method see Brandts & Charness 2011). Under the strategy method, participants 
are asked whether they would Take or not Take in the following order: 
 
1. First Mover, Round 1 
2. First Mover, Round 2 
3. Second Mover, Post-Take  
4. Second Mover, Post-Don’t Take 
 
The strategy method is used to maximize the statistical power of both Experiment 1 and 2 
increasing the number of observations for each information set. Though the strategy method 
eliminates feedback between participants, Fischbacher et al. (2012) find no systematic 
differences between the direct response method10 and the strategy method. Likewise, in a survey 
of literary comparisons between the strategy and direct response method, Brandts & Charness 
(2011) find that only four of twenty nine experiments show differences in behaviour.  
 
Incentives were designed to reflect wages paid in Australia given that participants will spend 
approximately 40 to 60 minutes engaged in the experiment and received a show up fee of 5 
AUD. For Experiment 1, participants received their payoff from one of the three vendetta games 
they play (chosen at random). Participants were not told which of the three mini-vendetta games 
they would receive their payoff from until after the final questionairre. The conversion rate was 
1 Token = $0.40AUD. 
                                                 
 
10 In the setting of sequential games, the direct response method involves participants making decisions in 
response to their co-participants decision 
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4.4 Demographic and Questionairre Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics collected from the participants during Experiment 1. Note 
that in Experiment 1, the results from different match types have been aggregated with respect 
to matches played in different rounds. Further, two participants who did not utilize the chat 
have been dropped from the Experiment 1 dataset. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Participants underwent an understanding check prior to undertaking the mini-vendetta game, 
the results of which are reported in Understanding Check 1, Understanding Check 2, and 
Understanding Check 3. The questions used for the understanding check differ between the two 
experiments (see appendix A211).  
                                                 
 
11 Understanding Check 1: “Suppose there is a First Mover who decides to Take, and a Second Mover who also 
decides to Take. How many Tokens would the First Mover earn?” 
Understanding Check 2, Method 1: “In each Task I will be matched with a different co-participant. Is this 
statement correct?” 
Understanding Check 2, Method 2: “Suppose the computer has randomly chosen the Tokens earned in Part 1 to 
convert to Australian dollars. Also suppose that in Part 1 the computer has chosen to Take 20 Tokens from the 
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At the completion of the mini-vendetta game, participants self-reported their age, their gender 
(male, female, or other), whether English was their native language, whether they are an 
undergraduate or postgraduate student, and whether they are studying or have studied 
economics in the past.  
 
Participants also completed a belief elicitation questionnaire, providing the results for Ingroup 
Belief, Outgroup Belief, Neutral Belief, and group association (see appendix A3). Ingroup 
Belief, Outgroup Belief, and Neutral Belief measure participants’ belief on how likely a co-
participant of the given match type is to Take12. Group association measures the level of 
association participants’ felt towards their group and acts as a proxy for the strength of the 
group inducement process13. Participants were also asked a series of true and false questions in 
order to provide an SDS17 score (see appendix A1).  
  
                                                 
 
members of the Orange Group and give them to the members of the Brown Group. Including the 5 Australian 
dollars received for participation, how many Australian Dollars will the earn from this experiment?” 
Understanding Check 3: “The First Mover makes up to two decisions while the Second Mover will only ever 
make a single decision. Is this statement correct?” 
12 Neutral Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they did not know whether their co-
participant was from the Orange [if Method 2, else Kandinsky] or Brown [if Method 2, else Klee] Group?” 
Ingroup Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they knew that their co-participant 
was from the same group as theirs?” 
Outgroup Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they knew that their co-participant 
was from a different group than theirs?” 
13 Group Association Question: “On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own 
group throughout the experiment?” 
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5 Experiment 1 Results 
In this section, we report the results from Experiment 1. Specifically, we analyse the impact of 
our different treatments on Take rates in the mini-vendetta game. Furthermore, we examine 
participants propensity to Take in relation to potential confounds, self-reported levels of group 
association, and participants’ beliefs. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents the mean of participants’ decision to Take under different information sets in 
the vendetta game under Experiment 1. Calculating the mean provides us with the ‘Take rate’ 
- the percentage of participants that took in a given environment.  
 
Table 4: Mean of Participants' Decision to Take, Experiment 1 
 
 
Note that FM_Round1 refers to the information set First Mover Round 1, FM_Round2 refers 
to First Mover Round 2, SM_Post-T refers to Second Mover Post-Take, and SM_Post-D refers 
to Second Mover Post-Don’t Take.  
 
For Experiment 1, participant Take rates for different information sets and under different 
treatments is represented in Figure 2 presents the mean take rates under each decision node, 
based on whether the participants were matched with a member of the same group, different 
group, or of unknown group. DN, DO, and DI refer to the the decision of participants to not Take 
in the Neutral, Outgroup, and Ingroup Treatment. Similarly, TN, TO, and TI refer to the the 
decision of participants to Take in the Neutral, Outgroup, and Ingroup Treatment. 
 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
                                                                                  
                        (0.367)         (0.281)         (0.281)         (0.313)   
SM_Post-D                 0.159           0.085           0.085           0.110   
                        (0.189)         (0.262)         (0.241)         (0.232)   
SM_Post-T                 0.963           0.927           0.939           0.943   
                        (0.281)         (0.329)         (0.110)         (0.261)   
FM_Round2                 0.915           0.878           0.988           0.927   
                        (0.468)         (0.425)         (0.452)         (0.448)   
FM_Round1                 0.317           0.232           0.280           0.276   
                                                                                  
                        Ingroup         Neutral        Outgroup           Total   
                                                                                  
                                                                                  
Mean of Participants' Decision to Take
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Overall there are no statistically significant differences in beheviour across groups. In 
particular, in First Mover Round 1 information set, they chose to take 23% of the time when 
matched with a person of unknown group, 28% of the times when matched with a person from 
a different group, and 32% of the time when matched with a person from the same group,. These 
differences are in direct opposition with H1, as we would expect take rates to be lower in the 
Ingroup relative to the Outgroup or the Neutral group. Nevertheless, these differences are not 
statistically significantly different (McNemar, DN > DI FM_Round1, p-value = 0.607; DO > DI 
FM_Round1, p-value = 0.607).    
 
Figure 2: Decision Tree, Take Rates, Experiment 1 
 
 
For the within-subject design for Experiment 1, the McNemar nonparametric test evaluates 
whether the distribution of subjects who changed their response from Don’t Take to Take is 
significantly different to the distribution of participants who changed their response from Take 
to Don’t Take when applying the Ingroup and Outgroup Treatments. 
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The McNemar test fails to confirm that there exists a significant difference between the Ingroup 
and Outgroups’ decisions as First Mover Round 1 and Second Mover Post-Take (FM_Round1: 
p-value = 0.607; SM_Post-T: p-value = 0.688). The only two cases where the observed 
behaviour is in line with H1 are  in the second round of First Mover’s choice, where we find 
that the Ingroup are less likely to Take than the Outgroup under the First Mover Round 2 
(McNemar, p-value = 0.031) information set and more likely to Take under the Second Mover 
Post-Don’t Take (McNemar, p-value = 0.07) information set. 
 
E1. Result 1: Experiment 1 fails to support the first hypothesis in that participants do not 
consistently exhibit an ingroup bias when comparing their decisions under the Ingroup and 
Outgroup Treatments. 
 
For Experiment 1, the McNemar Test can be used to test whether there is a significant difference 
between the change in participants responses when applying the Ingroup and Neutral 
Treatments. Since none of the information sets are significant, we find no support for a 
relationship between the Ingroup Treatment, relative to the Neutral Treatment, on Take rates 
(FM_Round1: p-value = 0.144; FM_Round2: p-value = 0.508; SM_Post-T: p-value = 0.508; 
SM_Post-D: p-value = 0.180).  
 
E1. Result 2: Experiment 1 fails to support the second hypothesis in that participants do not 
consistently exhibit positive discrimination when comparing their decisions under the Ingroup 
and Neutral Treatments. 
 
The McNemar test can be applied to evaluate whether there is a significant difference between 
the change in participants' responses when applying the Outgroup and Neutral Treatments. In 
this instance, all of the information sets are insignificant (FM_Round1: p-value = 0.455; 
SM_Post-T: p-value = 1; SM_Post-D: p-value = 1) with the exception of the First Mover Round 
2 (McNemar, p-value = 0.004).  
 
E1. Result 3: Experiment 1 fails to support the third hypothesis in that participants do not 
consistently exhibit negative discrimination when comparing their decisions under the 
Outgroup and Neutral Treatments.  
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5.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 5 presents the results of a probit model for Experiment 1 with the information sets in the 
vendetta game being the dependent variable. The probit model is clustered on the subject level 
to account for the within-subject design of Experiment 1.  
 
Probit (1) contains only the Match O Dummy and Match I Dummy variables, equal to 1 if the 
participants’ decision was under the Outgroup and Ingroup Treatments respectively. Note that 
here the Neutral Treatment serves as the baseline and is equivalent to both the Match O Dummy 
and Match I Dummy variables equaling 0.  
 
Probit (2) includes additional controls for the participants’ decision. These include the age in 
years of the participant, whether the participant is male or female, whether the participants’ 
native language is English, whether the participant is a postgraduate or undergraduate student, 
the participants’ SDS17 score, how many characters were sent between members of the same 
group identity (chat), and dummy variables that reflect whether the participant got the three 
understanding checks incorrect or correct.  
  
Table 5: Clustered Probit for Likelihood to Take, Experiment 1 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                       
N                     246          246          246           96          246           96          246          240   
Pseudo-R2           0.005        0.152        0.073        0.392        0.010        0.051        0.017        0.153   
                                                                                                                       
                   (0.00)       (0.64)       (0.00)       (0.34)       (0.00)       (0.49)       (0.00)       (0.08)   
constant           -0.733***     0.603        1.165***    -5.075        1.453***     0.605       -1.370***    -1.560   
                                (0.32)                       (.)                    (0.58)                    (0.62)   
understanding~3                 -0.276                     0.000                     0.204                    -0.134   
                                (0.05)                    (0.01)                       (.)                    (0.13)   
understanding~2                  1.054*                    1.907*                    0.000                     0.818   
                                (0.48)                       (.)                       (.)                       (.)   
understanding~1                 -0.313                     0.000                     0.000                     0.000   
                                (0.29)                    (0.15)                    (0.97)                    (0.24)   
Chat                             0.000                     0.002                     0.000                     0.001   
                                (0.01)                    (0.02)                    (0.65)                    (0.13)   
SDS16 Score                      0.121**                  -0.250*                   -0.036                     0.091   
                                (0.35)                    (0.31)                    (0.95)                    (0.75)   
Postgraduate                    -0.315                    -0.830                     0.024                    -0.083   
                                (0.13)                    (0.81)                    (0.86)                    (0.27)   
Economics Study                 -0.521                     0.239                    -0.070                     0.353   
                                (0.65)                    (0.05)                       (.)                    (0.02)   
Native English                  -0.155                     1.585                     0.000                    -1.021*  
                                (0.24)                    (0.86)                    (0.69)                    (0.85)   
Female                          -0.341                     0.132                    -0.249                     0.077   
                                (0.01)                    (0.29)                    (0.35)                    (0.03)   
Age                             -0.109*                    0.218                     0.030                    -0.066*  
                   (0.09)       (0.08)       (0.32)       (0.26)       (0.32)       (0.34)       (0.11)       (0.05)   
Match I Dummy       0.257        0.301        0.205        0.444        0.339        0.368        0.369        0.473   
                   (0.32)       (0.30)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.66)       (0.76)       (1.00)       (0.82)   
Match O Dummy       0.152        0.187        1.086**      1.937***     0.094        0.085       -0.000        0.052   
                                                                                                                       
                      b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p   
                      (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)   
                         FM Round 1                FM Round 2               SM Post-Take              SM Post-Don't    
                                                                                                                       
 In line with our parametric tests (see Result 1, Result 2, and Result 3), the outcome of the probit 
models contained in Table 20 suggest that only the Outgroup Treatment for information set 
First Mover Round 2 had a statistically significant effect (p-value = 0.00). In this instance, the 
Outgroup Treatment increases the propensity of a participant to Take and the propensity to Take 
increases when controlling for confounds in model 2 (model 1 coefficient = 1.086, model 2 
coefficient = 1.876). The number of characters sent between group members during the group 
inducement process is used as a measure of Ingroup interaction. While it is expected that higher 
Ingroup interaction would increase group association, the variable chat is not statistically 
significant. None of the remaining control variables (age, female, native english, economics 
study, postgraduate, SDS17, and  the understanding checks) are statistically significant across 
all information sets. 
 
E1. Result 4: no information sets, save for First Mover Round 2, have statistically significant 
Treatment effects even when controlling for demographic and understanding check differences 
across participants. For the First Mover Round 2 information set, there is a negative 
discrimination effect against the Outgroup match. 
 
5.3 Learning and Order Effects 
In order to be able to better compare Experiment 1’s within-subject observations, the behaviour 
of participants must be controlled for both order and learning effects in a probit model.  
 
In the case of learning effects, this is done via the inclusion of a categorical variable (referred 
to as period) for whether the participant made the decision in the first, second, or third mini-
vendetta game played. In the case of order effects, this is done via the inclusion of a dummy 
variable for whether the participant played a given treatment in the second or third mini-
vendetta game played (with the first game played serving as the baseline). The dummy variables 
for order effects are OTask2Match and OTask3Match for if the Outgroup Treatment was 
applied in the second and third mini-vendetta game respectively. Likewise, ITask2Match and 
ITask3Match refer to the Ingroup Treatment.  
 
Table 6 presents the results of the probit for Experiment 1 with the information sets in the 
vendetta game being the dependent variable. The probit model is clustered on the subject level 
to account for the within-subject design of Experiment 1.  
 
Probit (3) contains the Match O Dummy variable, Match I Dummy variable, and the order and 
learning effect controls. Note that Probit (3) excludes the controls included in Probit (2). Probit 
(4) includes the additional controls for the participants’ decision that were used in Probit (2).  
  
Table 6: Clustered Probit for Likelihood to Take, Order Effects, Experiment 1 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                       
N                     246          246          246          246          246          111          246          246   
Pseudo-R2           0.129        0.209        0.145        0.316        0.116        0.139        0.100        0.223   
                                                                                                                       
                   (0.25)       (0.74)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)   
constant           -0.629       -0.321        6.160***     8.358***    -3.143***    -4.280***    -5.653***    -6.272***
                                (0.14)                    (0.40)                    (0.64)                    (0.24)   
Chat                             0.001                    -0.001                    -0.001                     0.001   
                                (0.02)                    (0.01)                    (1.00)                    (0.19)   
SDS16 Score                      0.117*                   -0.229**                  -0.000                     0.098   
                                (0.08)                    (0.24)                    (0.44)                    (0.93)   
Postgraduate                    -0.572                    -0.778                    -0.350                     0.028   
                                (0.02)                    (0.09)                    (0.69)                    (0.04)   
Economics Study                 -0.612*                   -0.592                    -0.205                     0.634*  
                                (0.57)                    (0.02)                       (.)                    (0.02)   
Native English                  -0.191                     1.036*                    0.000                    -1.016*  
                                (0.54)                    (0.48)                    (0.80)                    (0.78)   
Female                          -0.174                    -0.247                    -0.155                     0.102   
                                (0.11)                    (0.10)                    (0.24)                    (0.09)   
Age                             -0.053                     0.131                     0.052                    -0.066   
                   (0.09)       (0.06)       (0.56)       (0.39)       (0.48)       (0.46)       (0.71)       (0.70)   
period              0.183        0.213       -0.078       -0.140        0.105        0.140        0.044        0.049   
                   (0.00)       (0.03)       (0.85)       (0.71)       (0.45)       (0.48)       (0.20)       (0.25)   
ITask3Match        -0.970**     -0.790*       0.112       -0.190       -0.387       -0.386       -0.484       -0.489   
                   (0.17)       (0.33)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)   
ITask2Match        -0.650       -0.497       -4.643***    -6.332***     4.013***     4.128***     4.566***     5.109***
                   (0.20)       (0.09)       (0.09)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.75)       (0.52)   
OTask3Match         0.377        0.594       -0.675       -1.708***     4.632***     4.606***    -0.133        0.268   
                   (0.52)       (0.71)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)   
OTask2Match        -0.365       -0.236       -4.823***    -6.969***     4.530***     4.295***     4.261***     5.108***
                   (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.23)       (0.17)       (0.32)       (0.33)       (0.09)       (0.06)   
Match I Dummy       0.334        0.362        0.238        0.311        0.336        0.383        0.419        0.499   
                   (0.64)       (0.67)       (0.01)       (0.00)       (0.77)       (0.75)       (0.98)       (0.90)   
Match O Dummy       0.090        0.088        1.173**      1.580***     0.067        0.094       -0.007        0.032   
                                                                                                                       
                      b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p   
                      (3)          (4)          (3)          (4)          (3)          (4)          (3)          (4)   
                         FM Round 1                FM Round 2               SM Post-Take              SM Post-Don't    
                                                                                                                       
The results of the probit model contained in Table 6 suggest that the information sets First 
Mover Round 2, Second Mover Post-Take, and Second Mover Post-Don’t Take are 
significantly affected by order effects under both the Ingroup and Outgroup Treatments. For 
the information set First Mover Round 2, order effects are only statistically significant under 
the Ingroup Treatment. Order effects are most predominant for treatments in the second 
vendetta game played. The presence of order effects supports the adoption of a between-subject 
design in Experiment 2.  
 
By contrast, learning effects are not statistically significant across any information sets. Note 
that controlling for order and learning effects does not alter the direction or significance of the 
treatment effects captured by the variables Match O Dummy and Match I Dummy.  
 
E1. Result 5: under Experiment 1, the influence of learning effects on decisions in the mini-
vendetta game are unsubstantiated. While order effects have a statistically significant impact 
on the mini-vendetta game across all treatments, the results of the treatments remain 
qualitatively the same 
 
5.4 Within-Group Attributes 
In line with the Minimal Group Paradigm, the group identity that participants are induced in 
should not be strongly associated with the participants’ confounding characteristics. In this 
sense, the preference selection over paintings in Experiment 1 should be unrelated to self-
reported levels of group association. 
 
We calculate the sum of an individual’s preferences over the sets of paintings, encoding a Klee 
selection with a value of 1 and a Kandinsky selection with a value of 2. The self-reported level 
of group association is used as the dependent variable and the quartile of a participant’s summed 
preferences (Quartile Pref.) as an independent variable in an ordinal logit model and OLS 
model. This allows us to test whether participant characteristics influence the strength of the 
group inducement process in Experiment 1, with the results reported in table Table 7.  
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Table 7: Ordinal Logit and OLS on Group Association, Experiment 1 
 
 
In Experiment 1, a participant’s painting preference quartile has a statistically significant effect 
on their self-reported level of group association when using an ordinal logit model. However, 
the effect is small and is also not statistically significant when using an OLS model. The number 
of characters sent between participants (given by the Chat variable) in Experiment 1 has a 
statistically significant effect on the level of group association. Putting aside the issue of reverse 
causality between Chat and the level of group association, this suggests that the heterogeneous 
number of characters sent between groups could lead to significant differences in participant’s 
level of group association and is a potential failure of Experiment 1. 
 
E1. Result 6: while painting preferences do not alter the strength of Experiment 2’s group 
inducement process, the number of characters sent between participants is a potential confound 
for a participant’s self-reported level of group association  
 
5.5 Strategy Type Classifications 
Within our subject pool, we distinguish between 4 types of strategy profiles, in line with the 
classification outlined in Cavatorta, Zizzo, and Daoud (2019). Based on the participants’ 
decision as the Second Mover, we typify their strategy as either:  
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➢ Always Take (1|t, 1|not t) 
➢ Never Take (0|t, 0|not t) 
➢ Conditionally Take (1|t, 1|not t) 
➢ Contrarily Take (0|t, 1|not t) 
 
Where ‘1|t, 1|not t’ indicates strategy ‘Take if Taken from, Take if not Taken from’ and ‘0|t, 
0|not t’ indicates strategy ‘do not Take if Taken from, do not Take if not Taken from’, and so 
forth. The classification of participants is summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Participant Classification 
 Always Take Never Take Conditional 
Attacker 
Contrarian 
Attacker 
Response, Co-Participant 
Taking 
Take Don’t Take Take Don’t Take 
Response, Co-Participant Not 
Taking 
Take Don’t Take Don’t Take Take 
 
Given H2, that the Ingroup exhibits positive discrimination, we would expect that participants 
exposed to the Ingroup Treatment would be more likely to adopt the ‘Never Take’ and 
‘Conditionally Take’ strategies relative to the Outgroup and Neutral Treatments. By contrast, 
we would expect that participants exposed to the Outgroup Treatment would be more likely to 
adopt the ‘Always Take’ strategy relative to the Neutral and Ingroup Treatments14.  
 
For Experiment 1, the distribution of participants by type are reported in Table 9. 
 
                                                 
 
14 Note that due to the lack of participants who adopted the ‘Contrarily Take’ and ‘Never Take’ strategies in both 
Method 1 (see Table 9) and Method 2 (see Table 23), these two strategies are excluded from the analysis for the 
remainder of this subsection. 
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Table 9: Experiment 1 Distribution of Participant Strategy Classifications 
 
 
Given the lack of variation of participant type between Experiment 1’s treatments, it is clear 
that Experiment 1 does not support our hypotheses. Table 10 reports the results of a probit 
model, used to estimate the effect of the different match types, which supports the view of group 
identity’s null effects in Experiment 1. 
 
                                                                                                                          
Total                        82        33.33           82        33.33           82        33.33          246       100.00
                                                                                                                          
Never Take                    3         1.22            3         1.22            5         2.03           11         4.47
Contrarily Take               0         0.00            3         1.22            0         0.00            3         1.22
Conditionally Take           66        26.83           72        29.27           70        28.46          208        84.55
Always Take                  13         5.28            4         1.63            7         2.85           24         9.76
                                                                                                                          
                           freq            %         freq            %         freq            %         freq            %
Strategy                         Ingroup                   Neutral                    Outgroup                  Total     
                                                                                                                          
Frequency Table: Strategy Type Classifications
Table 10: Clustered Probit, Strategy Classifications, Experiment 1 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                               
N                        246             246             246             246             246             246   
Pseudo-R2              0.037           0.120           0.136           0.008           0.152           0.162   
                                                                                                               
                      (0.00)          (0.59)          (0.27)          (0.00)          (0.79)          (0.51)   
constant              -1.657***       -0.439          -0.885           1.165***        0.186           0.446   
                                                      (0.32)                                          (0.40)   
Chat                                                   0.001                                          -0.001   
                                      (0.83)          (0.43)                          (0.80)          (0.50)   
SDS16 Score                            0.016           0.047                          -0.015          -0.036   
                                      (0.44)          (0.45)                          (0.64)          (0.68)   
Postgraduate                          -0.261          -0.256                           0.143           0.127   
                                      (0.32)          (0.30)                          (0.14)          (0.15)   
Economics Study                        0.336           0.335                          -0.427          -0.413   
                                      (0.07)          (0.04)                          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Native English                        -0.788          -0.899*                          1.213**         1.298** 
                                      (0.95)          (0.97)                          (0.68)          (0.68)   
Female                                 0.024           0.017                          -0.146          -0.152   
                                      (0.05)          (0.04)                          (0.11)          (0.09)   
Age                                   -0.055          -0.058*                          0.044           0.048   
                      (0.18)          (0.16)          (0.08)          (0.53)          (0.45)          (0.39)   
Match O Dummy          0.287           0.305           0.348          -0.113          -0.157          -0.176   
                      (0.01)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.11)          (0.08)          (0.06)   
Match I Dummy          0.656**         0.718**         0.765***       -0.306          -0.372          -0.390   
                                                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                         (1)             (2)             (3)             (1)             (2)             (3)   
                                      Always Take                                 Conditionally Take                
                                                                                                               
Probit Model: Strategy Typle Classifications
Though the Ingroup Treatment has a statistically significant effect in predicting that the 
participant adopts an ‘Always Take’ strategy (compared to the baseline Neutral Treatment), 
this contradicts H2 in that the Ingroup does not elicit positive discrimination. Furthermore, the 
Outgroup Treatment has no statistically significant effect on the participant’s adoption of the 
‘Always Take’ strategy or the ‘Conditionally Take’ strategy.  
 
E1. Result 7: Experiment 1 fails to elicit differences in participant’s strategies, with respect to 
treatments, that are consistent with our three hypotheses. Specifically, the effect of the Ingroup 
Treatment contradicts hypothesis 2  
 
The influence of group identity on Take rates hinges on the effectiveness of group inducement. 
A participant’s level of association with their group identity should be positively related to the 
behavioural difference seen between group match types.  
 
Extending the probit model, used to test the effect of the treatments on participants’ strategies 
in Experiment 1, Table 11 indicates that group association is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 11:Clustered Probit with Group Association, Strategy Classifications, Experiment 1 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                        246             246             246             246   
Pseudo-R2              0.037           0.144           0.008           0.175   
                                                                               
                      (0.00)          (0.42)          (0.00)          (0.82)   
constant              -1.644***       -0.682           1.155***        0.171   
                                      (0.22)                          (0.17)   
Chat                                   0.001                          -0.001   
                                      (0.38)                          (0.39)   
SDS16 Score                            0.055                          -0.049   
                                      (0.60)                          (0.93)   
Postgraduate                          -0.173                          -0.027   
                                      (0.45)                          (0.29)   
Economics Study                        0.256                          -0.314   
                                      (0.04)                          (0.00)   
Native English                        -0.998*                          1.449** 
                                      (0.85)                          (0.60)   
Female                                 0.080                          -0.210   
                                      (0.03)                          (0.06)   
Age                                   -0.066*                          0.060   
                      (0.94)          (0.28)          (0.94)          (0.20)   
Group Association       -0.004          -0.066           0.004           0.087   
                      (0.16)          (0.09)          (0.53)          (0.38)   
Match O Dummy          0.285           0.345          -0.113          -0.184   
                      (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.11)          (0.06)   
Match I Dummy          0.655**         0.767***       -0.306          -0.402   
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                         (4)             (5)             (4)             (5)   
                              Always Take                Conditionally Take                                
                                                                               
Probit Model: Strategy Typle Classifications
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The effect of the change in group association on the probability of a participant adopting an 
‘Always Take’ or ‘Conditionally Take’ strategy can be more precisely estimated via obtaining 
conditional marginal effects from probit model (4). In this instance, we expect that participants 
exhibit diminishing marginal effects of group association. Experiment 1’s conditional marginal 
effects for probit model (4) are reported in Table 12.  
 
Table 12: Probit (4) Conditional Marginal Effects, Experiment 1 
 
 
For Experiment 1, the marginal effect of the participants’ level of group association in 
predicting their strategy is not statistically significant across any of treatments.  
 
E1. Result 8: for Experiment 1, participants’ self-reported levels of group association has no 
statistically significant impact on the strategy adopted in the vendetta game 
 
5.6 Group Association and Belief of Co-Participant Behaviour 
The relationship between group association and a participant’s belief of their co-participant’s 
chance of taking varies by match type. For participants with a strong sense of group association, 
it is expected that they would believe that their co-participant would be less likely to Take under 
the Ingroup Treatment when compared to the Outgroup Treatment. By contrast, it is expected 
that a participant with a strong sense of group association would believe that their co-participant 
would be more likely to Take under the Outgroup Treatment relative to the Ingroup Treatment. 
It follows that for the Neutral Treatment, a participant’s sense of group association would be 
less related to their belief of their co-participant taking. Therefore, the relationship between a 
participant’s sense of group association and their belief of their co-participant taking should be 
the following: 
GA: level of group association related to the marginal effect
                                                                                             
p-value                0.935        0.935        0.934        0.940        0.940        0.940
ME (GA = 5)          -0.0011      -0.0007      -0.0004       0.0011       0.0009       0.0008
p-value                0.936        0.937        0.937        0.941        0.941        0.941
ME (GA = 0)          -0.0011      -0.0007      -0.0005       0.0011       0.0009       0.0008
p-value                0.936        0.936        0.935        0.941        0.941        0.941
Average ME           -0.0011      -0.0007      -0.0005       0.0011       0.0009       0.0008
                                                                                             
                     Ingroup     Outgroup      Neutral      Ingroup     Outgroup      Neutral
                                Always Take                         Conditionally Take                                                                          
                                                                                             
Probit (4) Conditional Marginal Effects, Method 1
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Mechanism 1: for the relationship between group association and belief of co-
participant taking, the sense of group association should be negatively related to belief 
in Ingroup co-participant taking and positively related to belief in Outgroup and Neutral 
co-participant taking 
 
Mechanism 2: for a strong sense of group association, the belief of Ingroup co-
participant taking is strongly lower than the belief of Outgroup and Neutral co-
participant taking  
 
Mechanism 3: for a low sense of group association, the belief of Ingroup co-participant 
taking is not significantly different than the belief of Outgroup and Neutral co-
participant taking 
 
To test whether these three mechanisms are violated in Experiment 1, we calculate the average 
of the beliefs for participants above and below the median level of group association. The 
resulting average of participants’ beliefs of a co-participant taking are reported in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Median-Split of Group Association on Belief of Co-participant Taking, Experiment 1 
 
 
For Experiment 1, mechanism 2 holds in that participants with a strong sense of group 
association believe that an Ingroup co-participant is less likely to Take than an Outgroup and 
Neutral co-participant.  Mechanism 3 also holds where participants with a weak sense of group 
association exhibit similar beliefs of their co-participant taking regardless of whether their co-
participant is in the Outgroup, Ingroup, or Neutral.  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
                                                                  
                        (0.344)         (2.432)         (2.627)   
Group Association         0.864           4.921           2.744   
                        (5.599)         (3.771)         (5.154)   
Outgroup Belief           6.500          10.105           8.171   
                        (5.516)         (4.241)         (5.211)   
Neutral Belief            6.886          10.105           8.378   
                        (5.959)         (3.206)         (4.875)   
Ingroup Belief            7.068           7.421           7.232   
                                                                  
                          Below           Above           Total   
                                                                  
                                                                  
Belief of Co-Participant Taking given Median Split of Group Association
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Concerning mechanism 1, participant’s belief of whether their co-participant will Take or not 
Take is positively related with the participants' sense of group identity for both the Outgroup 
(Fisher’s Exact test, p-value = 0.000) and Neutral (Fisher’s Exact test, p-value = 0.007) 
Treatments. In line with expectations, this positive relationship is stronger for a participant’s 
belief of an Outgroup co-participant taking than their belief of a Neutral co-participant taking.  
However, violating mechanism 1, there is a positive relationship between a participant’s sense 
of group identity and their belief that an Ingroup participant will Take (Fisher’s Exact test, p-
value = 0.000). Though it should be noted that the relationship between a participant’s sense of 
group identity and their belief that their co-participant will Take under the Ingroup Treatment 
is weak relative to the Outgroup and Neutral Treatments.  
 
E1. Result 9: Experiment 1 is in line with mechanism 2 in that a strong sense of group 
association leads to participants’ belief that an Ingroup co-participant take rates would be 
lower relative to Outgroup and Neutral co-participants. Likewise, mechanism 3 holds whereby 
subjects with low levels of group association do not hold significantly different beliefs with 
respect to their co-participants’ group identity. 
 
5.7 Influence and Direction of Beliefs 
In this subsection, the influence of a participant’s beliefs on their co-participant is examined. 
Specifically, we analyze the impact of pariticant’s belief of their co-participant’s likelihood to 
Take with respect to the identity of their co-participant.  
 
5.7.1 Neutral Treatment 
In the case of the First Mover’s Round 2 decision, if the participant believes that their co-
participant is likely to Take then they can exploit a “wait-and-see”15 strategy to attain the 
identical payoffs from (Take; Take) and (Don’t Take, Take; Take). Therefore, the First Mover 
should be more likely to not Take in round 1 if they believe that the Second Mover is also likely 
to Take. In the case of the First Mover strongly believing that the Second Mover will not Take 
then they can attain the maximum payoff from the strategy set (Take; Don’t Take).  
 
                                                 
 
15 The “wait-and-see” strategy refers to when the First Mover participant chooses Don’t Take in the first round to 
see whether their co-participant would Take 
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For the First Mover’s Round 2 decision, which is arrived at only if the choices (Don’t Take; 
Take) were made, the First Mover’s belief of how likely the Second Mover is to Take has no 
impact on the vendetta game’s payoff.  
 
The relationship between the participants’ Take rate as the Second Mover and their belief of 
high likely their co-participant is to Take depends on the First Mover’s initial decision. If the 
First Mover decided to initially Take, the Second Mover’s belief of how likely the First Mover 
is to Take has no impact on the vendetta game’s payoff. However, if the First Mover decided 
to initially not Take, then if the Second Mover strongly believes that the First Mover is not 
likely to Take then the Second Mover can attain the maximum payoff from the strategy set 
(Don’t Take, Don’t Take; Take).  
 
To summarize, under the Neutral Treatment, it is expected that the participant’s belief of high 
likely their co-participant is to Take has the following relationships their Take rate: 
 
➢ First Mover, Round 1: Take rate is positively related to believing the co-participant will 
Take 
➢ First Mover, Round 2: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will Take 
➢ Second Mover, Post-Take: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will 
Take 
➢ Second Mover, Post-Don’t Take: Take rate is positively related to believing the co-
participant will Take 
 
Table 14 shows the results from a probit model restricted to the observations collected for the 
Neutral Treatment under Experiment 1. Note that the variable Neutral Belief refers to 
participants’ responses to the following question: 
 
“There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they did not 
know whether their co-participant was from the Kandinsky or Klee Group?” 
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Table 14: Clustered Probit for Likelihood to Take, Neutral Belief, Experiment 1 
 
 
The results from the probit model are not in line with expectations for all information sets, save 
for Second Mover Post-Take wherein the Take rate is not related to Neutral Belief. For the First 
Mover Round 1 and First Mover Round 2 information sets the Take rate is positively related to 
believing that the Neutral co-participant will Take. For the Second Mover Post-Don’t Take 
information set, Neutral Belief is not statistically significant. 
 
E1. Result 10: Take rates in the First Mover Round 1 (p-value = 0.00) and First Mover Round 
2 (p-value = 0.00) information sets are positively related with beliefs over whether a Neutral 
co-participant would Take. Beliefs regarding Neutral co-participants are not statistically 
significant for the Second Mover Post-Take and Second Mover Post-Don’t Take information 
sets. 
 
5.7.2 Ingroup Treatment 
In the case of the Ingroup Treatment, it is expected that ingroup bias and prosocial preferences 
will cause a greater preference for the outcome (Don’t Take; Don’t Take) when compared to 
the Neutral and Outgroup Treatments. Thus, for the Ingroup, the Take rate should be less 
positively related to believing the co-participant will Take relative to the Neutral and Outgroup 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                        246             246              48             177   
Pseudo-R2              0.344           0.259           0.081           0.149   
                                                                               
                      (0.48)          (0.75)          (0.26)          (0.88)   
constant              -1.006           0.534           3.471           0.252   
                      (0.21)          (0.00)          (0.32)          (0.52)   
SDS16 Score            0.097          -0.245***       -0.147          -0.057   
                      (0.71)          (0.06)          (0.37)          (0.66)   
Postgraduate          -0.285          -1.493           0.911           0.320   
                      (0.47)          (0.64)             (.)             (.)   
Economics Study        0.309           0.239           0.000           0.000   
                      (0.43)          (0.34)             (.)          (0.01)   
Native English        -0.315           0.399           0.000          -1.285*  
                      (0.02)          (0.16)             (.)          (0.55)   
Female                -0.897*         -0.491           0.000          -0.346   
                      (0.10)          (0.15)          (0.44)          (0.68)   
Age                   -0.090           0.112          -0.089          -0.028   
                      (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.95)          (0.25)   
Neutral Belief         0.186***        0.101**         0.009           0.048   
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                   FM_Round1       FM_Round2       SM_Post-T       SM_Post-D   
                                                                               
Probit Model: Propensities to take with respect to neutral belief
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Treatment. To summarize, under the Ingroup Treatment we have the following relationships 
between Take rates and beliefs: 
 
➢ First Mover, Round 1: Take rate is less positively related to believing the co-participant 
will Take relative to the Neutral and Outgroup Treatment 
➢ First Mover, Round 2: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will Take 
➢ Second Mover, Post-Take: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will 
Take 
➢ Second Mover, Post-Don’t Take: Take rate is less positively related to believing the co-
participant will Take compared to the Neutral and Outgroup Treatment 
 
Table 15 shows the results from a probit model restricted to the observations collected for under 
the Ingroup Treatment for Experiment 1. Note that the variable Ingroup Belief refers to 
participants’ responses to the following question: 
 
“There are 16 participants in this room, including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they knew 
that their co-participant was from the same group as theirs?” 
 
Table 15: Clustered Probit, Ingroup Take Rates on Ingroup Belief, Experiment 1 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                        246             147              51             246   
Pseudo-R2              0.248           0.110           1.000           0.206   
                                                                               
                      (0.77)          (0.14)             (.)          (0.84)   
constant              -0.309           2.255        -196.178          -0.215   
                      (0.01)          (0.34)          (0.00)          (0.34)   
SDS16 Score            0.186*         -0.055          22.269***        0.087   
                      (0.02)             (.)          (0.00)          (0.93)   
Postgraduate          -1.052*          0.000         -69.573***       -0.041   
                      (0.50)             (.)             (.)          (0.64)   
Economics Study       -0.250           0.000           0.000          -0.198   
                      (0.38)          (0.11)             (.)          (0.02)   
Native English        -0.345           0.630           0.000          -1.097*  
                      (0.05)          (0.75)          (0.00)          (0.37)   
Female                -0.784*          0.122         147.339***        0.422   
                      (0.04)          (0.53)          (0.00)          (0.02)   
Age                   -0.080*         -0.040           1.137***       -0.083*  
                      (0.00)          (0.28)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
Ingroup Belief         0.123***       -0.047         -11.101***        0.087** 
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                   FM_Round1       FM_Round2       SM_Post-T       SM_Post-D   
                                                                               
Probit Model: Propensities to take with respect to ingroup belief
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For the First Mover Round 1 information set, Ingroup Belief is statistically significant and has 
less influence on Take rates than Outgroup Belief and Neutral Belief does in their respective 
treatment groups (see probit model in Table 16 and Table 14). However, it is still positively 
related to Take rates and therefore contradicts expectations. Likewise, for the Second Mover 
Post-Don’t Take information set, Ingroup Belief is statistically significant and has less influence 
on Take rates than the Outgroup Belief (see Table 16)16 though is still positively related with 
Take rates. The Second Mover Post-Take information set is statistically significant and 
therefore not in line with expectations. The First Mover Round 2 information set is in line with 
expectations in that Ingroup Belief is not statistically significant. 
 
E1. Result 11: Take rates in the First Mover Round 1 and Second Mover Post-Don’t Take 
information sets are positively related with beliefs over whether an Ingroup co-participant 
would Take. Take rates in the Second Mover Post-Take information set are negatively related 
with beliefs regarding Ingroup co-participants. Beliefs regarding Ingroup co-participants are 
not statistically significant for the First Mover Round 2 information set. 
 
5.7.3 Outgroup Treatment 
In the Outgroup Treatment, it is expected that ingroup bias and antisocial preferences, will cause 
a greater preference for the outcome (Take; Don’t Take) and (Don’t Take, Don’t Take; Take) 
when compared to the Neutral and Ingroup Treatments. Thus, the Take rate, for the Outgroup, 
should be more positively related to believing the co-participant will Take relative to the 
Ingroup and Outgroup Treatments. To summarize, under the Outgroup Treatment we have the 
following relationships between Take rates and beliefs: 
 
➢ First Mover, Round 1: Take rate is more postively related to believing the co-participant 
will Take compared to the Neutral and Ingroup Treatment 
➢ First Mover, Round 2: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will Take 
➢ Second Mover, Post-Take: Take rate is not related to believing the co-participant will 
Take 
                                                 
 
16 For the Second Mover Post-Don’t Take information set we cannot draw a comparison between the Ingroup 
and Neutral group due to the Neutral Belief not having a statistically significant effect 
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➢ Second Mover, Post-Don’t Take: Take rate is more positively related to believing the 
co-participant will Take compared to the Neutral and Ingroup Treatment 
 
Table 16 shows the results from a probit model restricted to the observations collected for under 
the Outgroup Treatment under Experiment 1. Note that the variable Outgroup Belief refers to 
participants’ responses to the following question: 
 
“How many do you think chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First 
Mover and if they knew that their co-participant was from a different group than theirs?” 
 
Table 16: Clustered Probit for Likelihood to Take, Outgroup Belief, Experiment 1 
 
 
Behaviour in The First Mover Round 1 information set is in line with expectations wherein 
Outgroup Belief is statistically significant and has a greater influence on Take rates than 
Ingroup Belief and Neutral Belief does in their respective treatment groups (see probit model 
in Table 14 and Table 15). However, both the Second Mover Post-Take and Second Mover 
Post-Don’t Take information sets are violate expectations, with Outgroup Beliefs affecting 
behaviour in the Second Mover Post-Take information set and Outgroup Beliefs being 
statistically significant in the wrong direction. Note that the First Mover Round 2 information 
set has been omitted due to perfect predictive power between Outgroup Belief and Take rates. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
FM_Round1 ommitted due to being perfectly predicted by outgroup beliefs
                                                                  
N                           246             111             147   
Pseudo-R2                 0.344           0.405           0.246   
                                                                  
                         (0.66)          (0.59)          (0.24)   
constant                  0.705           1.335           3.020   
                         (0.21)          (0.72)          (0.45)   
SDS16 Score               0.094          -0.074           0.104   
                         (0.67)          (0.23)             (.)   
Postgraduate             -0.297          -1.203           0.000   
                         (0.00)          (0.11)             (.)   
Economics Study          -1.370**        -2.317           0.000   
                         (0.62)             (.)          (0.13)   
Native English            0.204           0.000          -0.880   
                         (0.85)          (0.62)          (0.67)   
Female                    0.069          -0.656          -0.246   
                         (0.12)          (0.62)          (0.02)   
Age                      -0.138           0.048          -0.292*  
                         (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
Outgroup Belief           0.187***        0.355**         0.134** 
                                                                  
                            b/p             b/p             b/p   
                      FM_Round1       SM_Post-T       SM_Post-D   
                                                                  
Probit Model: Propensities to take with respect to outgroup belief
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E1. Result 12: for Experiment 1, Take rates in the First Mover Round 1 (p-value = 0.00), 
Second Mover Post-Don’t Take, and Second Mover Post-Take information sets are positively 
related with beliefs over whether an Outgroup co-participant would Take 
 
5.8 Power Analysis 
Given the lack of significant results between the Ingroup and Outgroup Treatment17, we conduct 
a power analysis for the information sets in Experiment 1. Note that, due to the First Mover 
Round 2 information set being significant (McNemar, p-value =  0.0313) at the 5% level, a 
power analysis is only conducted for the First Mover Round 1, Second Mover Post-Take, and 
Second Mover Post-Don’t Take information sets. For the purpose of this sample size analysis, 
power is set to 0.8 and alpha is set to 0.05. In line with the usage of the McNemar test used for 
Result 1.M1, a paired proportions test with values of the discordant proportions is conducted.  
 
Table 17 reports the required sample size to achieve statistically significant values (p-value = 
0.05) in a comparison of means between the Ingroup and Outgroup Treatment.  
 
Table 17: Sample Sizes for Significant Ingroup vs Outgroup Treatment Effects 
 
 
The large number of participants required to achieve significant results echoes the treatments’ 
statistically insignificant effects. Furthermore, even if significant results were achieved, the 
Treatment effects would be in the opposite direction of our hypotheses (see Table 4) 
 
 
                                                 
 
17 Note that the Outgroup and Ingroup treatments are used for the power analysis since the two treatments are 
expected to have the greatest difference in behavioural effects relative to comparisons with the Neutral treatment 
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6 Experiment 2 Design 
This section presents the design for Experiment 2. Experiment 2 retains the same mini-vendetta 
game as Experiment 1 (see section 4.1) and aims to address experiments 1’s issues relating to 
order effects and weak levels of group association. Specifically, due to finding no systematic 
difference in participants’ behaviour under Experiment 1 (see Table 5), Experiment 2 was 
designed to further strengthen the group inducement process by using a group lottery to prime 
participants. Experiment 1 contains a group induction process, an understanding check, one 
round of the mini-vendetta game, and a questionnaire.  
 
6.1 Experiment 2 – Common Fate Priming 
For Experiment 2, the group inducement method used is a modification of Chen and Li (2009)’s 
group inducement method. In this instance, painting preferences were still used for group 
assignment however the groups were referred to as the Orange group and Brown group in place 
of the Kandinsky group and Klee group. Furthermore, instead of the chat priming and group 
task used in Experiment 1, common fate priming is used based on Zizzo (2003).   
 
The common fate priming method involved the use of a group lottery, with all members of the 
same group receiving identical outcomes from the lottery. In this instance, there is a 50% chance 
that members of the Orange group receive 40 Tokens each and members of the Brown group 
receive 0 Tokens each. Likewise, there is a 50% chance that members of the Orange group 
receive 0 Tokens each and members of the Brown group receive 40 Tokens each. Since there 
is no interaction between participants in the group inducement phase, the number of subjects in 
each group is not fixed. The outcome of the lottery is not revealed until the end of the 
experiment. 
 
In summary, the group inducement process is as follows: 
 
1. Participants are presented with a series of 5 pairs of anonymized paintings by Klee and 
Kandinsky (see appendix A6) and for each given pair select which painting they prefer  
2. Participants are assigned into either the Orange or Brown group based on their relative 
painting preferences 
3. Participants are provided with details relating to the group lottery and the outcome of 
the group lottery is determined by the computer (though is not revealed to participants 
until the end of the experiment) 
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After group inducement has taken place, participants play a single one-shot mini-vendetta game 
of a given match type. For the match type, we employ two treatments: the Ingroup Treatment 
(I) and Outgroup Treatment (O). The qualities of the two treatments are outlined in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Treatments, Experiment 2 
Treatment Match Features 
Ingroup Treatment (I) The participant is matched with a homogeneous counter-participant 
Outgroup Treatment (O) The participant is matched with a heterogeneous counter-participant 
 
Note that as a result of participants not exhibiting significantly different Take rates between the 
Ingroup and Outgroup Treatments (see Result E2.1), we determined that we would not conduct 
experiments using the Neutral Treatment for Experiment 2. As a result, Experiment 2 only tests 
the occurance of ingroup bias that is posited in hypothesis 1 (see section 3). 
 
Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 uses a between-subject design where participants either 
have the Ingroup Treatment or Outgroup Treatment applied. The change to a between-subject 
design addresses the potential of learning and order effects causing insignificant results under 
Experiment 1 (see Table 6). 
 
Furthermore, the payoff from a participant choosing Take and their co-participant choosing 
Don’t Take was increased from 100 Tokens to 120 Tokens while the payoff from both the 
participant and co-participant choosing Take was increased from 20 Tokens to 40 Tokens each. 
This was to increase the incentive to Take in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1. 
 
6.2 Experiment Procedures 
The experiment took place in the Behavioural and Economic Science Cluster Laboratory 
(BESC) at the University of Queensland (UQ) with a total of 82 participants from undergraduate 
and postgraduate backgrounds. The participants were randomly selected using the ORSEE 
recruitment system (Greiner 2004). The experiment program was designed using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and the experimental data was converted into Stata format using ztree2stata 
(Takeuchi, 2010). 
 
Prior to the vendetta game being played, participants underwent an understanding check (see 
appendix A2). Post the vendetta game being played, participants underwent a questionnaire 
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related to demographics, beliefs, and the SDS17 (for a discussion of the SDS17 see Stober 
2001). 
 
As in Experiment 1, we utilize the strategy method instead of the direct response method in 
order to get a complete strategy set from every participant. Under the strategy method, 
participants were asked whether they would Take or not Take in the following order: 
 
5. First Mover, Round 1 
6. First Mover, Round 2 
7. Second Mover, Post-Take  
8. Second Mover, Post-Don’t Take 
 
Incentives were designed to reflect wages paid in Australia given that participants will spend 
approximately 30 to 50 minutes engaged in the experiment and received a show up fee of 5 
AUD. For Experiment 2, participants received their payoff from either the group lottery or the 
vendetta game (chosen at random). Participants were not told whether they would receive their 
payoff from the group lottery or the mini-vendetta game until after the final questionairre. The 
conversion rate was 1 Token = $0.20AUD. 
 
6.3 Demographic and Questionairre Statistics 
Table 19 presents descriptive statistics collected from the participants during Experiment 2. 
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Participants underwent an understanding check prior to undertaking the mini-vendetta game, 
the results of which are reported in Understanding Check 1, Understanding Check 2, and 
Understanding Check 3. The questions used for the understanding check differ between the two 
experiments (see appendix A218).  
 
At the completion of the mini-vendetta game, participants self-reported their age, their gender 
(male, female, or other), whether English was their native language, whether they are an 
undergraduate or postgraduate student, and whether they are studying or have studied 
economics in the past.  
                                                 
 
18 Understanding Check 1: “Suppose there is a First Mover who decides to Take, and a Second Mover who also 
decides to Take. How many Tokens would the First Mover earn?” 
Understanding Check 2, Method 1: “In each Task I will be matched with a different co-participant. Is this 
statement correct?” 
Understanding Check 2, Method 2: “Suppose the computer has randomly chosen the Tokens earned in Part 1 to 
convert to Australian dollars. Also suppose that in Part 1 the computer has chosen to Take 20 Tokens from the 
members of the Orange Group and give them to the members of the Brown Group. Including the 5 Australian 
dollars received for participation, how many Australian Dollars will the earn from this experiment?” 
Understanding Check 3: “The First Mover makes up to two decisions while the Second Mover will only ever 
make a single decision. Is this statement correct?” 
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Participants also completed a belief elicitation questionnaire, providing the results for Ingroup 
Belief, Outgroup Belief, Neutral Belief, and group association (see appendix A3). Ingroup 
Belief, Outgroup Belief, and Neutral Belief measure participants’ belief on how likely a co-
participant of the given match type is to Take19. Group association measures the level of 
association participants’ felt towards their group and acts as a proxy for the strength of the 
group inducement process20. Participants were also asked a series of true and false questions in 
order to provide an SDS17 score (see appendix A1).  
  
                                                 
 
19 Neutral Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they did not know whether their co-
participant was from the Orange [if Method 2, else Kandinsky] or Brown [if Method 2, else Klee] Group?” 
Ingroup Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they knew that their co-participant 
was from the same group as theirs?” 
Outgroup Belief Question: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many do you think 
chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and if they knew that their co-participant 
was from a different group than theirs?” 
20 Group Association Question: “On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own 
group throughout the experiment?” 
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7 Experiment 2 Results 
In this section, we report the results from Experiment 2. Specifically, we analyse the impact of 
our different treatments on Take rates in the mini-vendetta game. Furthermore, we examine 
participants propensity to Take in relation to potential confounds, self-reported levels of group 
association, and participants’ beliefs. 
 
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 20 presents the mean of participants’ decision to Take under different information sets in 
the vendetta game under Experiment 221. Calculating the mean provides us with the ‘Take rate’ 
- the percentage of participants that took in a given environment. 
 
Table 20: Mean of Participants' Decision to Take, Experiment 2 
 
 
Note that FM_Round1 refers to the information set First Mover Round 1, FM_Round2 refers 
to First Mover Round 2, SM_Post-T refers to Second Mover Post-Take, and SM_Post-D refers 
to Second Mover Post-Don’t Take. 
 
For Experiment 2, participant Take rates for different information sets and under different 
treatments are represented in Figure 3. DN, DO, and DI refer to the the decision of participants 
to not Take in the Neutral, Outgroup, and Ingroup Treatment. Similarly, TN, TO, and TI refer to 
the the decision of participants to Take in the Neutral, Outgroup, and Ingroup Treatment. 
 
                                                 
 
21 Note that, due to the lack of variation between the decisions made under the Ingroup treatment and Outgroup 
treatment, experiments using the Neutral treatment were not conducted.  
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
                                                                  
                        (0.393)         (0.362)         (0.375)   
SM_Post-D                 0.184           0.150           0.167   
                        (0.273)         (0.267)         (0.268)   
SM_Post-T                 0.921           0.925           0.923   
                        (0.273)         (0.362)         (0.322)   
FM_Round2                 0.921           0.850           0.885   
                        (0.506)         (0.490)         (0.497)   
FM_Round1                 0.474           0.375           0.423   
                                                                  
                        Ingroup        Outgroup           Total   
                                                                  
                                                                  
Mean of Participants' Decision to Take
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Overall there are no statistically significant differences in beheviour between the Outgroup and 
Ingroup Treatments. In particular, for the First Mover Round 1 information set, they chose to 
take 47% of the time when matched with a person of in the same group and 38% of the time 
when matched with a person from a different group. These differences are in direct opposition 
with H1, as we would expect take rates to be lower in the Ingroup relative to the Outgroup. 
Nevertheless, these differences are not statistically significantly different (Fisher, FM_Round1 
DO > DI, p-value = 0.257).    
 
 
Figure 3: Decision Tree, Take Rates, Experiment 2 
 
 
For Experiment 2, we find no support of a relationship between the effect of the Ingroup 
Treatment and the Outgroup Treatment on Take rates. When using the Fisher-Exact 
nonparametric test, to compare the decisions of the Ingroup and Outgroup, none of the 
information sets are significant (FM_Round1: p-value = 0.257; FM_Round2: p-value = 0.267; 
SM_Post-T: p-value = 0.638; SM_Post-D: p-value = 0.459). 
 
E2. Result 1: Experiment 2 fails to support the first hypothesis in that participants do not 
consistently exhibit an ingroup bias when comparing their decisions under the Ingroup and 
Outgroup Treatments. 
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7.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 21 presents the results of a probit model for Experiment 2 with the information sets in 
the vendetta game being the dependent variable.  
 
Probit (1) contains only the Match O Dummy, equal to 1 if the participants’ decision was under 
the Outgroup Treatment. Note that here the Ingroup Treatment serves as the baseline, due to 
not conducting the Neutral Treatment, and is equivalent to the Match O Dummy variable 
equaling 0.  
 
Probit (2) includes additional controls for the participants’ decision. These include the age in 
years of the participant, whether the participant is male or female, whether the participants’ 
native language is English, whether the participant is a postgraduate or undergraduate student, 
the participants’ SDS16 score, and dummy variables that reflect whether the participant got the 
three understanding checks incorrect or correct.  
  
Table 21: Probit for Likelihood to Take, Experiment 2 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                       
N                      78           78           78           78           78           78           78           78   
Pseudo-R2           0.007        0.061        0.018        0.082        0.000        0.329        0.002        0.140   
                                                                                                                       
                   (0.75)       (0.20)       (0.00)       (0.45)       (0.00)       (0.36)       (0.00)       (0.28)   
constant           -0.066        1.802        1.412***     1.294        1.412***     2.221       -0.899***     1.732   
                                (0.29)                    (0.16)                    (0.47)                    (0.49)   
understanding~3                 -0.339                     0.570                    -0.544                    -0.275   
                                (0.57)                    (0.91)                    (0.65)                    (0.62)   
understanding~2                 -0.178                     0.052                    -0.292                     0.192   
                                   (.)                       (.)                       (.)                       (.)   
understanding~1                  0.000                     0.000                     0.000                     0.000   
                                (0.92)                    (0.73)                    (0.07)                    (0.13)   
SDS16 Score                      0.007                     0.031                     0.249                    -0.118   
                                (0.57)                    (0.96)                    (0.22)                    (0.18)   
Postgraduate                    -0.257                    -0.029                     1.323                    -0.841   
                                (0.52)                    (0.94)                    (0.40)                    (0.34)   
Economics Study                 -0.244                    -0.039                     0.536                    -0.435   
                                (0.13)                    (0.76)                    (0.70)                    (0.08)   
Native English                  -0.542                     0.158                    -0.238                    -0.831   
                                (0.28)                    (0.83)                    (0.65)                    (0.20)   
Female                          -0.373                     0.096                    -0.276                    -0.528   
                                (0.42)                    (0.70)                    (0.21)                    (0.70)   
Age                             -0.041                    -0.023                    -0.102                    -0.022   
                   (0.38)       (0.53)       (0.33)       (0.30)       (0.95)       (0.71)       (0.69)       (0.58)   
Match O Dummy      -0.253       -0.190       -0.376       -0.448        0.027        0.202       -0.137       -0.209   
                                                                                                                       
                      b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p          b/p   
                      (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)          (1)          (2)   
                         FM Round 1                FM Round 2               SM Post-Take              SM Post-Don't    
                                                                                                                       
None of the independent variables in Table 21 are statistically significant. Furthermore, with 
the exception of the Second Mover Post-Take information set, the coefficient for the Outgroup 
Treatment is in the opposite direction than what H1 suggests.  
 
E2. Result 2: for Experiment 2, no information sets have statistically significant Treatment 
effects even when controlling for demographic and understanding check differences across 
participants 
 
7.3 Within-Group Attributes 
In line with the Minimal Group Paradigm, the group identity that participants are induced in 
should not be strongly associated with the participants’ confounding characteristics. In this 
sense, the preference selection over paintings in Experiment 2 should be unrelated to self-
reported levels of group association. 
 
We calculate the sum of an individual’s preferences over the sets of paintings, encoding a Klee 
selection with a value of 1 and a Kandinsky selection with a value of 2. The self-reported level 
of group association is used as the dependent variable and the quartile of a participant’s summed 
preferences (Quartile Pref.) as an independent variable in an ordinal logit model and OLS 
model. This allows us to test whether participant characteristics influence the strength of the 
group inducement process in Experiment 1, with the results reported in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Ordinal Logit and OLS on Group Association, Experiment 2 
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In Experiment 2, a participant’s painting preference does not have a significant effect on their 
level of group association in both the ordinal logit and OLS model. Perhaps, the lack of a 
communication aspect in the group inducement process limits subject’s interactions and 
therefore reduces heterogeneity between subjects’ level of group association. 
 
E2. Result 3: painting preferences do not alter the strength of Experiment 1’s group 
inducement process 
 
7.4 Strategy Type Classifications 
As in Experiment 1, we distinguish between 4 types of strategy profiles (see section 5.5), in 
line with the classification outlined in Cavatorta, Zizzo, and Daoud (2019). Based on the 
participants’ decision as the Second Mover, we typify their strategy as either:  
 
➢ Always Take (1|t, 1|not t) 
➢ Never Take (0|t, 0|not t) 
➢ Conditionally Take (1|t, 1|not t) 
➢ Contrarily Take (0|t, 1|not t) 
 
Given H1, which posits the existence of ingroup bias when comparing Ingroup to Outgroup 
matches, we would expect that participants exposed to the Ingroup Treatment would be more 
likely to adopt the ‘Never Take’ and ‘Conditionally Take’ strategies relative to the Outgroup 
Treatment. By contrast, we would expect that participants exposed to the Outgroup Treatment 
would be more likely to adopt the ‘Always Take’ strategy relative to the Ingroup Treatment22.  
 
For Experiment 2, the distribution of participants by type are reported in Table 23. 
 
                                                 
 
22 Note that due to the lack of participants who adopted the ‘Contrarily Take’ and ‘Never Take’ strategies in both 
Method 1 (see Table 9) and Method 2 (see Table 23), these two strategies are excluded from the analysis for the 
remainder of this subsection. 
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Table 23: Experiment 2 Distribution of Participant Strategy Classifications 
 
 
Again, using a probit model to estimate the effect of group identity indicates the lack of effect 
of Experiment 2’s different treatments – as shown in Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Probit, Strategy Classifications, Experiment 2 
 
 
In the case of Experiment 2, neither the Outgroup or Ingroup Treatments have a statistically 
significant effect on the participant’s adoption of the ‘Always Take’ strategy or the 
‘Conditionally Take’ strategy.  
 
E2. Result 4: for Experiment 2, there is no support for hypothesis 1, wherein group identity 
has no statistically significant influence on the strategy of participants  
 
                                                                                                
Total                        38        48.72           40        51.28           78       100.00
                                                                                                
Never Take                    2         2.56            2         2.56            4         5.13
Contrarily Take               1         1.28            1         1.28            2         2.56
Conditionally Take           29        37.18           32        41.03           61        78.21
Always Take                   6         7.69            5         6.41           11        14.10
                                                                                                
                           freq            %         freq            %         freq            %
Strategy                         Ingroup                   Outgroup                   Total     
                                                                                                
Frequency Table: Strategy Type Classifications
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                         78              78              78              78   
Pseudo-R2              0.003           0.202           0.002           0.207   
                                                                               
                      (0.00)          (0.31)          (0.00)          (0.67)   
constant              -1.003***        1.783           0.716**        -0.650   
                                      (0.85)                          (0.07)   
SDS16 Score                           -0.016                           0.136   
                                      (0.11)                          (0.02)   
Postgraduate                          -1.072                           1.480*  
                                      (0.02)                          (0.11)   
Female                                -1.123*                          0.644   
                                      (0.35)                          (0.16)   
Economics Study                       -0.461                           0.608   
                                      (0.01)                          (0.04)   
Native English                        -1.463*                          0.924*  
                                      (0.52)                          (0.33)   
Age                                   -0.043                          -0.054   
                      (0.68)          (0.69)          (0.69)          (0.57)   
Match O Dummy         -0.147          -0.170           0.125           0.214   
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                         (1)             (2)             (1)             (2)   
                             Always Take                  Conditionally Take                                
                                                                               
Probit Model: Strategy Typle Classifications
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Extending the probit model, used to test the effect of the treatments on participants’ strategies 
in Experiment 2, Table 25 indicates that group association is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 25: Probit with Group Association, Strategy Classifications, Method 2 
 
 
The effect of the change in group association on the probability of a participant adopting an 
‘Always Take’ or ‘Conditionally Take’ strategy can be more precisely estimated via obtaining 
conditional marginal effects from probit model (3). In this instance, we expect that participants 
exhibit diminishing marginal effects of group association. Experiment 1’s conditional marginal 
effects are reported in Table 26.  
 
Table 26: Probit (3) Conditional Marginal Effects, Experiment 2 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                         78              78              78              78   
Pseudo-R2              0.025           0.219           0.009           0.245   
                                                                               
                      (0.00)          (0.40)          (0.00)          (0.81)   
constant              -1.287***        1.511           0.875**        -0.370   
                                      (0.57)                          (0.03)   
SDS16 Score                           -0.053                           0.182*  
                                      (0.10)                          (0.01)   
Postgraduate                          -1.196                           1.709*  
                                      (0.04)                          (0.14)   
Female                                -1.013*                          0.590   
                                      (0.36)                          (0.13)   
Economics Study                       -0.471                           0.691   
                                      (0.03)                          (0.09)   
Native English                        -1.285*                          0.780   
                                      (0.60)                          (0.28)   
Age                                   -0.035                          -0.064   
                      (0.24)          (0.30)          (0.45)          (0.08)   
Group Association        0.070           0.079          -0.041          -0.119   
                      (0.57)          (0.54)          (0.63)          (0.41)   
Match O Dummy         -0.202          -0.261           0.155           0.315   
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                         (3)             (4)             (3)             (4)   
                             Always Take                  Conditionally Take                                
                                                                               
Probit Model: Strategy Typle Classifications
GA: level of group association related to the marginal effect
                                                                   
p-value                0.279        0.265        0.466        0.460
ME (GA = 5)           0.0181       0.0146      -0.0130      -0.0115
p-value                0.105        0.072        0.387        0.359
ME (GA = 0)           0.0122       0.0092      -0.0111      -0.0096
p-value                0.245        0.253        0.449        0.450
Average ME            0.0166       0.0141      -0.0125      -0.0113
                                                                   
                     Ingroup     Outgroup      Ingroup     Outgroup
                         Always Take            Conditionally Take                                                
                                                                   
Probit (3) Conditional Marginal Effects, Method 2
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For Experiment 2, the marginal effect of the participants’ level of group association in 
predicting their strategy is not statistically significant across any of treatments.  
 
E2. Result 5: for Experiment 2, participants’ self-reported levels of group association has no 
statistically significant impact on the strategy adopted in the vendetta game 
 
7.5 Group Association and Belief of Co-Participant Behaviour 
For Experiment 2, we again test the relationship between participants’ sense of group 
association and their belief of their co-participant taking should be the following. This is done 
in reference to the three mechanisms outlined in Experiment 1’s results (see section 5.2.5). 
 
To test whether these three mechanisms are violated in Experiment 2, we calculate the average 
of the beliefs for participants above and below the median level of group association. The 
resulting average of participants’ beliefs of a co-participant taking are reported in Table 27: 
 
Table 27: Median-Split of Group Association on Belief of Co-participant Taking, Experiment 2 
 
 
For Experiment 2, mechanism 2 holds in that participants with a strong sense of group 
association believe that an Ingroup co-participant is less likely to Take than an Outgroup and 
Neutral co-participant.  
 
Mechanism 3 is violated where participants with a weak sense of group association exhibit 
different beliefs of their co-participant taking depending on whether their co-participant is in 
the Outgroup, Ingroup, or Neutral.  
 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
                                                                  
                        (1.235)         (1.362)         (2.935)   
Group Association         1.714           6.972           4.141   
                        (5.135)         (3.574)         (4.631)   
Outgroup Belief           8.310          10.833           9.474   
                        (4.686)         (3.745)         (4.407)   
Neutral Belief            7.262           9.583           8.333   
                        (4.500)         (4.996)         (4.704)   
Ingroup Belief            6.595           6.694           6.641   
                                                                  
                          Below           Above           Total   
                                                                  
                                                                  
Belief of Co-Participant Taking given Median Split of Group Association
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Concerning mechanism 1, participant’s belief of whether their co-participant will Take or not 
Take is positively related with the participants' sense of group identity for the Outgroup 
(Fisher’s Exact test, p-value = 0.036). However, for both Neutral and Ingroup co-participants, 
this relationship is not statistically significant and therefore violates mechanism 1 (Fisher’s 
Exact test, Neutral group p-value = 0.097, Ingroup p-value = 0.941).  
 
Self-reported levels of group association were higher in Experiment 2, compared to Experiment 
1 (Mann-Whitney, p-value = 0.001). For Experiment 1 the mean level of group association was 
4.141 (see Table 27), while for Experiment 2 the mean level of group association was 2.744 
(see Table 13).  
 
E2. Result 6: for Experiment 2, mechanism 2 holds in that a strong sense of group association 
leads to participants’ belief that an Ingroup co-participant would Take being lower relative to 
Outgroup and Neutral co-participants. Likewise, mechanism 3 holds whereby subjects with low 
levels of group association do not hold significantly different beliefs with respect to their co-
participants’ group identity.  
 
E2. Result 7: Experiment 2’s group inducement method yielded stronger levels of group 
association relative to Experiment 1 
 
7.6 Influence and Direction of Beliefs 
In this subsection, the influence of a participant’s beliefs on their co-participant is examined. 
Specifically, we analyze the impact of participant’s belief of their co-participant’s likelihood 
to Take with respect to the identity of their co-participant.  
 
7.6.1 Ingroup Treatment 
Table 28 shows the results from a probit model restricted to the observations collected for the 
Ingroup Treatment under Experiment 2. 
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Table 28: Probit for Likelihood to Take, Ingroup Belief, Experiment 2 
 
 
Ingroup Belief does not have a statistically significant effect on any of the information sets. 
This confirms expectations for the First Mover Round 2 and Second Mover Post-Take 
information sets. However, it does not align with expectations for the First Mover Round 1 and 
Second Mover Post-Don’t Take information sets. 
 
E2. Result 8: for Experiment 2, the relationship between Ingroup Belief and Take rates is not 
statistically significant for any of the information sets. Therefore, the relationship between Take 
rates and Ingroup Beliefs is indeterminate. 
 
7.6.2 Outgroup Treatment 
Table 29 shows the results from a probit model restricted to the observations collected for under 
the Outgroup Treatment under Experiment 2. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                               
N                         38              38              38              38   
Pseudo-R2              0.215           0.265           0.464           0.121   
                                                                               
                      (0.14)          (0.99)          (0.99)          (0.92)   
constant               3.115           7.077           6.896           0.203   
                      (0.78)          (0.80)          (0.73)          (0.93)   
SDS16 Score            0.027          -0.054           0.089          -0.008   
                      (0.44)          (1.00)          (1.00)          (0.51)   
Postgraduate          -0.581          -4.352          -1.921          -0.572   
                      (0.42)          (0.26)          (0.24)          (0.72)   
Economics Study       -0.443           0.865           1.594          -0.232   
                      (0.01)          (1.00)          (0.99)          (0.23)   
Native English        -1.652*         -4.605          -5.121          -0.777   
                      (0.12)          (0.99)          (0.86)          (0.24)   
Female                -0.814           0.015          -0.223          -0.662   
                      (0.14)          (0.39)          (0.30)          (0.70)   
Age                   -0.113          -0.076          -0.174          -0.029   
                      (0.08)          (0.51)          (0.38)          (0.21)   
Ingroup Belief         0.101           0.055           0.170           0.073   
                                                                               
                         b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                   FM_Round1       FM_Round2       SM_Post-T       SM_Post-D   
                                                                               
Probit Model: Propensities to take with respect to ingroup belief
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Table 29: Probit for Likelihood to Take, Outgroup Take Rates, Experiment 2 
 
 
For the First Mover Round 1 information set, Outgroup Belief is statistically significant and 
has less influence on Take rates than Ingroup Belief does in the Ingroup Treatment group (see 
probit model in Table 28) – this is aligned with expectations. Also aligned with expectations, 
for the Second Mover Post- Take information set, Outgroup Belief has no statistically 
significant relationship with Take rates. Both the First Mover Round 2 and Second Mover Post-
Don’t Take information sets are against expectations, with Outgroup Belief being statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.04) for the First Mover Round 2 information set and Outgroup Belief 
being statistically insignificant for the Second Mover Post-Don’t Take information set.  
 
E2. Result 9: Take rates in the First Mover Round 1 (p-value = 0.01) and First Mover Round 
2 (p-value = 0.04) information sets are positively related with beliefs over whether an Outgroup 
co-participant would Take. In contrast, beliefs are not statistically significant both the Second 
Mover Post-Take and Second-Mover Post-Don’t Take information sets 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                  
N                            40              31              22              40   
Pseudo-R2                 0.209           0.316           0.674           0.544   
                                                                                  
                         (0.50)          (0.07)          (0.26)          (0.74)   
constant                 -1.851          -8.728          10.260           1.713   
                         (0.69)          (0.22)          (0.31)          (0.04)   
SDS16 Score              -0.046           0.181           0.369          -0.655*  
                         (0.61)          (0.20)          (0.28)          (0.20)   
Postgraduate             -0.353          -1.387           4.341          -3.698   
                         (0.77)             (.)          (0.60)          (0.41)   
Economics Study           0.198           0.000          -1.602          -0.866   
                         (0.79)          (0.72)             (.)          (0.28)   
Native English           -0.147          -0.342           0.000          -1.331   
                         (0.93)          (0.49)             (.)          (0.23)   
Female                   -0.051          -0.678           0.000           2.658   
                         (0.94)          (0.08)          (0.20)          (0.33)   
Age                       0.008           0.333          -0.432          -0.254   
                         (0.01)          (0.04)          (0.54)          (0.12)   
Outgroup Belief           0.174**         0.240*         -0.136           0.603   
                                                                                  
                            b/p             b/p             b/p             b/p   
                      FM_Round1       FM_Round2       SM_Post-T       SM_Post-D   
                                                                                  
Probit Model: Propensities to take with respect to outgroup belief
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7.7 Power Analysis 
Given the lack of significant results between the Ingroup and Outgroup Treatment23, we conduct 
a power analysis for the information sets in Experiment 1. Due to the inability to conduct sample 
analysis for the Fisher exact test since the relationship between power and sample size is not 
monotonic (for further discussion see Chernick & Liu 2002), a two-sample proportions test for 
Pearson’s chi-squared test is used.   
 
Table 30: Sample Sizes for Significant Ingroup vs Outgroup Treatment Effects 
 
 
The large number of participants required to achieve significant results echoes the treatments’ 
statistically insignificant effects. Relative to Experiment 2, the sample size required to achieve 
significant results is higher despite the Experiment 1 yielding stronger levels of group 
association (see E2. Result 7). Furthermore, even if significant results were achieved, the 
Treatment effects would be in the opposite direction of our hypotheses (see Table 4) 
  
                                                 
 
23 Note that the Outgroup and Ingroup treatments are used for the power analysis since the two treatments are 
expected to have the greatest difference in behavioural effects relative to comparisons with the Neutral treatment 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
To study the relationship between group identity and conflict, we conducted two experiments 
that involved participants being matched against either a homogeneous (Ingroup Treatment), 
heterogeneous (Outgroup Treatment), or unknown (Neutral Treatment) co-participant in a mini-
vendetta game. To establish a sense of group identity in participants, we used two different 
methods for artificial group inducement: chat priming (Experiment 1) and common fate priming 
(Experiment 2). We hypothesized that participants matched with a homogeneous co-participant 
would be less aggressive than participants matched with a heterogeneous co-participant, 
reflecting an ingroup bias (H1). Further, we posited that ingroup bias was the result of either 
positive discrimination against homogeneous co-participants (H2) or negative discrimination 
against heterogeneous co-participants (H3).  
 
Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 failed to confirm our hypotheses. Participants did not 
exhibit statistically significant behavioural differences between our three treatments. 
Specifically, we find no support for H1 when testing for behavioural differences between the 
Ingroup and Outgroup Treatments in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. It follows that, given 
the lack of ingroup bias, participants did not demonstrate positive discrimination under the 
Ingroup Treatment nor negative discrimination under the Outgroup Treatment. Testing for 
behavioural differences between the Ingroup and Neutral Treatments in Experiment 1 does not 
yield statistically significant results and therefore fails to support H2. Likewise, for H3 we find 
no statistically significant behavioural differences between the Outgroup and Neutral 
Treatments in Experiment 124.  
 
Another potential cause for participants’ lack of behavioural differences between match types 
is the complexity of the vendetta game. This is supported by (Guala & Filippin, 2017), who 
find that increasing the complexity of a game reduces ingroup bias in participants. However, 
given that participants displayed a high level of understanding during the understanding check 
stage of both experiments, the complexity of the experiment does not seem to be a primary 
cause of our results.  
 
                                                 
 
24 Note that for method 2, due to the lack of ingroup bias, we did not undertake experiments with the Neutral 
treatment.  
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While the effectiveness of the group inducement method could be an area of criticism, this 
claim has little merit. This is as the higher levels of group association in Experiment 2 resulted 
in an even weaker relationship between our treatments and behaviour relative to Experiment 1 
(see result E2.7). Though one area of potential future research is to conduct similar studies using 
natural groups, which, though prone to confounding factors, feature characteristics that are not 
present in minimally induced groups (see Ostrom et al. 1992).   
 
Given that Brandts & Charness (2011) find some support for emotionally motivated behavior 
being more likely under the direct response method, the use of the strategy method could have 
influenced our results by limiting feedback effects in the vendetta game. However, while the 
games in which Brandts & Charness (2011) find differences between the two methods involved 
emotionally motivated behaviour, none of these games involved group identity as a motivating 
factor. Furthermore, experiments conducted by Yamagishi & Kiyonari (2000) suggest that 
individuals would exhibit stronger ingroup bias under the strategy method. This is as the 
strategy method causes individuals to have higher expectations of reciprocity compared to 
revealed levels of reciprocity when there is direct feedback.  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that ingroup bias is not a significant determinant of behaviour in 
experimental settings. While we find no support for prosocial nor antisocial preferences under 
different treatments, the high instances of participants taking suggest that social preferences are 
a motivating factor for aggressive behaviour. 
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Appendices 
 
A.1 SDS17 Questionnaire 
The SDS17 questionnaire involves participants answering true a given statement describes 
them and false if otherwise. After each response to a statement, a new statement appears. The 
statements in the SDS17 questionnaire are as follows: 
 
1. I sometimes litter 
2. I always admit my misTakes openly and face the potential negative consequences 
3. In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others 
4. I always accept others’ opinions, even when they don’t agree with my own 
5. I Take out my bad moods on others now and then 
6. There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else 
7. In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences 
8. I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency 
9. When I have made a promise, I keep it – no ifs, ands or buts 
10. I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back 
11. I would never live off other people 
12. I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed out 
13. During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact 
14. There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowed 
15. I always eat a healthy diet 
16. Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return 
 
Note that the value inputs for the SDS17 questionnaire are (True = 0, False = 1) for statements 
1, 5, 10, 14, 16, and (True = 1, False = 0) for statements 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15. The 
participants’ SDS16 score is given by the sum of these value inputs.  
 
A.2 Understanding Check 
For Experiment 1 the understanding check questions were as follows: 
 
Question 1: “Suppose there is a First Mover who decides to Take, and a Second 
Mover who also decides to Take. How many Tokens would the First Mover earn?”  
(radio button) 20, (radio button) 140, (radio button) 100, (radio button) 80 
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Question 2: “In each Task I will be matched with a different co-participant. Is this 
statement correct?”  
(radio button) Yes, (radio button) No 
 
Question 3: “The First Mover makes up to two decisions while the Second Mover will 
only ever make a single decision. Is this statement correct?” 
(radio button) Yes, (radio button) No 
 
For Experiment 2 the understanding check questions were as follows: 
 
Question 1: “Suppose there is a First Mover who decides to Take, and a Second 
Mover who also decides to Take. How many Tokens would the First Mover earn?”  
(radio button) 40, (radio button) 120, (radio button) 100, (radio button) 80 
  
Question 2: “Suppose the computer has randomly chosen the Tokens earned in Part 1 
to convert to Australian dollars. Also suppose that in Part 1 the computer has chosen to 
Take 20 Tokens from the members of the Orange Group and give them to the members 
of the Brown Group. Including the 5 Australian dollars received for participation, how 
many Australian Dollars will the earn from this experiment?” 
(radio button) Yes, (radio button) No 
 
Question 3: “The First Mover makes up to two decisions while the Second Mover will 
only ever make a single decision. Is this statement correct?” 
(radio button) Yes, (radio button) No 
 
All understanding check questions, if answered incorrectly, were followed by a prompt 
explaining what the correct answer was. 
 
A.3 Belief Elicitation 
Neutral Belief, Ingroup Belief, and Outgroup Belief measure participants’ self-reported belief 
of how many co-participants, of a given group identity, out of 16 they expect to Take. 
Specifically, participants who undertook either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 were asked 
questions related to co-participants in the following order: 
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Neutral Belief: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many 
do you think chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and 
if they did not know whether their co-participant was from the Orange [if Experiment 2, 
else Kandinsky] or Brown [if Experiment 2, else Klee] Group?” 
 
Ingroup Belief: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many 
do you think chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and 
if they knew that their co-participant was from the same group as theirs?” 
 
Outgroup Belief: “There are 16 participants in this room including yourself. How many 
do you think chose to Take at the beginning of a Task if they were the First Mover and 
if they knew that their co-participant was from a different group than theirs?” 
 
For both Experiment 1 and 2, participants reported their level of group associations on a scale 
of 10, being asked:  
 
Group association: “On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt 
to your own group throughout the experiment?” 
 
A.4 Experiment 1, Experiment Screens 
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A.5 Experiment 1, Handouts  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
Overview 
This session is made up of Three Parts. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the Tasks from Part 2 
to calculate your earnings. Everyone will be paid in private at the end of the session. Further 
Details will be provided later on. 
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Preference Decisions 
Everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists, Klee and Kandinsky. You will be 
asked to choose which artist's painting in each pair you prefer. You will then be classified into 
one of two groups, based on your comparative preferences over the paintings.  
Please choose which painting you prefer by clicking on either the "Left Hand Side Painting" 
or "Right Hand Side Painting" buttons from each pair. 
After everyone submits their answers, you will be privately informed which group you are a 
member of. The participants you are grouped with will be the same for the rest of the 
experiment. 
 
 
Group Chat 
You and the other members of the Kandinsky group will now be asked to answer who made 
two other paintings. Note that you are not required to give the same answers as the other 
members of your group.   
Meanwhile, you may use the chat box on the next screen to get help from, or offer help, to 
other members of the Kandinsky group. Messages will be shared among all the members from 
your group. You will not be able to see the messages exchanged among those who are in the 
Klee group instead of your group.   
You will be given 10 minutes  to communicate with your group members. Please do not send 
any information that could be used to identify you (e.g. name, age, race, professional 
background, etc.). 
 
 
Part 2 Instructions 
 
Overview 
Part 2 consists of Three Tasks. 
In each Task, you will be matched with a different participant (your co-participant). There are 
two roles in each Task: the First Mover and the Second Mover.   
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At the end of the session, the computer will select a Task, a co-participant, and whether you 
are the First or Second Mover at random. In relation to the selected Task, the choices of the 
First Mover will be matched with the choices of the Second Mover to determine what 
happens and what the earnings are. 
  
 
Payment 
In relation to the randomly selected Task for payment, the Tokens you and your co-participant 
earn will be converted into Australian Dollars according to the following rate: 
1 Token = 0.4 Australian Dollars 
Each of you starts with 80 Tokens. 
 
 
Task Roles 
The First Mover 
The First Mover moves first. The First Mover decides whether to take or not to take 80 
Tokens away from the Second Mover.  
If the decision is to take 80 Tokens away from the Second Mover, then the First Mover gains 
20 Tokens and the Second Mover loses 80 Tokens.  
 
The Second Mover 
The Second Mover moves second. The Second Mover decides whether to take or not to take 
80 Tokens away from the First Mover.  
If the decision is to take 80 Tokens away from the First Mover, then the Second Mover gains 
20 Tokens and the First Mover loses 80 Tokens. 
 
 
Task Outcomes 
How Does The Task End 
The First Mover and the Second Mover take turns in moving. The Task ends if a participant 
responds to their co-participant by not taking or if both the First and Second Mover have 20 
Tokens or less. 
 
Possible Outcomes 
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1. The First Mover does not take and the Second Mover does not take. Each earns a total 
of 80  
2. The First Mover does not take, the Second Moves takes, and afterwards The First 
Mover then takes. Each earns a total of 20 Tokens. 
3. The First Mover does not take, the Second Moves takes, and afterwards The First 
Mover does not take. The First Mover earns a total of 0 Tokens and the Second Mover 
earns a total of 100 Tokens. 
4. The First Mover takes and the Second Mover does not take. The First Mover earns a 
total of 100 Tokens and the Second Mover earns a total of 0 Tokens.  
5. The First Movers takes and the Second Mover takes. Each earns a total of 20 Tokens.  
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A.6 Experiment 2, Outgroup Experiment Screens (excluding final questionnaire)  
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A.7 Experiment 2, Handouts  
 
Initial Task Instructions 
      
Overview 
This session is made up of an initial task, Part 1, Part 2, and a Final Questionnaire. 
Please read these instructions carefully, as they will help you to understand the nature of the 
decisions you will be asked to take today. In this session, your earnings will depend on the 
choices of you and other participants.  
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Everyone will be paid in private at the end of the session and your identity will remain 
anonymous.   
 
 
Painting Selection 
Everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists, Klee and Kandinsky. You will be 
asked to choose which artist's painting in each pair you prefer. You will then be classified into 
one of two groups, based on your comparative preferences over the paintings. 
The participants you are grouped with will be the same for the rest of the experiment 
Please choose which painting you prefer by clicking on either the "Left Hand Side Painting" or 
"Right Hand Side Painting" buttons from each pair. 
 
 
Payment 
To calculate your earnings from this experiment, the computer will randomly select either your 
Part 1 Token earnings or your Part 2 Token earnings to convert at the following exchange rate: 
1 Token = 0.2 AUD 
In addition to your earnings from either Part 1 or Part 2, you will receive 5 Australian dollars 
for participation. 
The details related to each Part will be provided at the start of each Part.  
 
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
 
Group Lottery 
Your Part 1 earnings are determined by a group lottery. 
All members of your group receive 20 Tokens. 
There is a 50% chance that the computer will take 20 Tokens from each member of the Brown 
Group and give it to the members of the Orange Group. In this case, you and your group 
members will earn 0 Tokens each. 
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Likewise, there is a 50% chance that the computer will take 20 Tokens from each member of 
the Orange Group and give it to the members of the Brown Group. In this case, you and your 
group members will earn 40 Tokens each. 
      
 
Outcome 
Whether you have had Tokens taken from you by the computer or received Tokens from the 
computer will be revealed at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Part 2 Instructions 
 
Overview 
In Part 2 you will be matched with a different participant (your co-participant). 
There are two roles: the First Mover and the Second Mover. 
At the end of the session, if the computer selects Part 2 for payoffs then the computer will also 
select whether you are the First or Second Mover at random. 
The choices of the First Mover will be matched with the choices of the Second Mover to 
determine what happens and what the earnings are. 
Each of you starts with 80 Tokens. 
 
 
Task Roles 
The First Mover 
The First Mover moves first. The First Mover decides whether to take or not to take 80 Tokens 
away from the Second Mover. 
If the decision is to take 80 Tokens away from the Second Mover, then the First Mover gains 
40 Tokens and the Second Mover loses 80 Tokens. 
 
The Second Mover 
The Second Mover moves second. The Second Mover decides whether to take or not to take 80 
Tokens away from the First Mover. 
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If the decision is to take 80 Tokens away from the First Mover, then the Second Mover gains 
40 Tokens and the First Mover loses 80 Tokens. 
 
 
Task Outcomes 
How Does The Task End 
The First Mover and the Second Mover take turns in moving. The Task ends if a participant 
responds to their co-participant by not taking or if both the First and Second Mover have 40 
Tokens or less. 
 
Possible Outcomes 
1. The First Mover does not take and the Second Mover does not take. Each earns a total 
of 80 
2. The First Mover does not take, the Second Moves takes, and afterwards the First Mover 
then takes. Each earns a total of 40 Tokens. 
3. The First Mover does not take, the Second Moves takes, and afterwards the First Mover 
does not take. The First Mover earns a total of 0 Tokens and the Second Mover earns a 
total of 120 Tokens. 
4. The First Mover takes and the Second Mover does not take. The First Mover earns a 
total of 120 Tokens and the Second Mover earns a total of 0 Tokens. 
5. The First Movers takes and the Second Mover takes. Each earns a total of 40 Tokens. 
 
 
 
